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76 VANDERBILT L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2023)
MACRO-JUDGING AND
ARTICLE III EXCEPTIONALISM
Merritt E. McAlister*
Over the last half-century, the federal courts have faced down two competing
crises: an increase in small, low-value litigation thought unworthy of Article III
attention and an increase in the numbers and complexity of “big” cases thought
worthy of those resources. The choice was what to prioritize and how, and the answer
the courts gave was consistent across all levels of the federal judiciary. Using what
this Article calls “macro-judging,” Article III judges entrenched their own power
and autonomy to focus on the work they deemed most “worthy” of their attention,
while outsourcing less “important” work to an array of non-Article III
decisionmakers (including law clerks, staff attorneys, and magistrate judges). These
reforms have prioritized judicial control, power, and autonomy, and they have
ensured the maintenance of a small, elite, and selective federal bench focused on only
what they deem to be the most “important” federal work.
Ultimately, “macro-judging” has enabled courts to maintain and perpetuate
Article III exceptionalism—that is, the view that federal courts should be small,
elite, and focused on “big” or “important” cases. Whether Article III
exceptionalism comes from the near obsessive focus of scholars on the federal courts
or is a byproduct of the commonplace desire to increase power in, recognition for, and
autonomy over one’s work, the federal judicial culture of elitism that has developed
carries significant risks for democracy. By exalting the federal judiciary as elite and
special, the ordinary litigant in the civil system loses out on Article III attention.
Article III exceptionalism may also foster a judicial culture that eschews restraint,
as judges issue bolder, bigger rulings thought worthy of a high-profile federal
judiciary. Each day brings new signs of the costs of unbridled and self-important
federal courts: a Supreme Court emboldened to cast aside precedent disfavored by a
new majority; intermediate appellate courts dismantling the administrative state;
and district courts overriding national public health policy. To combat these
challenges, this Article argues for a rethinking of the role of federal courts to
reinvigorate their public-service mission—a return, perhaps, to Article III
ordinariness.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For
exceedingly helpful and generous comments on earlier drafts, I thank Stephanie
Bornstein, Andrew Hammond, Judith Resnik, Laura Rosenbury, and participants at
the 2022 Civil Procedure Workshop at Cardozo Law School. All mistakes, errors,
and omissions that remain are my own. [More acknowledgements go here]
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last half century, the federal courts faced competing
crises: a vast rise in the number of small, seemingly pedestrian federal
cases and an increase in both the numbers and complexity of “big”
cases.1 Courts at every level could not sustainably meet both demands
while maintaining a small Article III bench or while giving all cases
equal (or something close to equal) attention. The courts were at a
crossroads: either they had to grow substantially, or they had to change
how they do business. For the most part, they did the latter—and that
evolution has had profound consequences for how the Article III
courts operate today.
Through what I call “macro-judging,” which are judicial decisions
at the macro-level to assign judicial work, set judicial priorities, and
organize judicial institutions, Article III judges reorganized their
institutions to create a differentiated and variegated workforce. Article
III judges remained focused on the most “important” matters
(however defined by the Article III judges themselves),2 and other,
non-Article III decisionmakers handled the rest. The innovations
Article III courts developed to tackle these problems all share a core
common feature: they exalt the federal bench as elite and focused on
only the work worthy of their attention. These reforms all have
entrenched what I call “Article III exceptionalism,” that is the view
that Article III courts are “special” places,3 with elite judges,4 whose

1 See infra Part II (chronicling these developments and changes throughout the
federal bench in response).
2 Importance is a fluid category, but it may be defined as much by what it is not
as by what it is: for the most part, the disfavored cases are those ordinary (that is,
non-mass tort or class action) civil matters brought by unrepresented litigants,
prisoners, or other marginalized litigants. Perhaps the best example contrasting the
“ordinary” against the “important” is how the federal appellate courts organize their
triage regimes, where (in most circuits) certain classes of cases (like immigration
matters, Social Security claims, and claims by unrepresented persons) go to staff
attorneys by default for handling in the first instance without oral argument and
published decision-making. For more discussion on how the federal triage regime
operates, see Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention as a Scarce Resource: A Preliminary Defense
of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 401 (2013), and RICHARD A. POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY: MY FORMER COURT NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF ATTORNEY
PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS ORAL ARGUMENTS 49-61 (2017).
3 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, U. COLO. L. REV.
581, 581 (1985) (“Central to the debate [over the role of the federal judiciary] is some
shared notion about the special qualities of federal courts. . . . Federal courts and
their judges, as created by Article III, are special.”) [hereinafter Resnik, Mythic].
4 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Inquiry: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 929 (2000) (“Federal judges describe
their courts as the venue for ‘important’ matters as contrasted (implicitly and
sometimes explicitly) with ‘ordinary’ . . . litigation.”) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial];
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 277 (1996)
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work should focus on only the most important federal cases.5 The
narrative of Article III exceptionalism has shaped the federal courts
profoundly. For decades, in various ways, at every level of the federal
judiciary, Article III judges have organized their internal affairs—and,
when necessary, lobbied Congress—to increase their discretion over
agenda-setting (that is, how judges spend their time and on what) and
to keep the federal judiciary small, elite, and focused only on work
worthy of their first-rate abilities.
That Article III exceptionalism has become the norm may have
been inevitable. Article III courts are the one percent.6 Literally. They
see (less than) one percent of litigation nationwide,7 yet they receive a
vastly disproportionate amount of scholarly (and popular) attention.
Even within Article III courts, we’re perhaps obsessively focused on
the Supreme Court—often for good reason, given that Court’s ability
to shape our everyday lives in profound ways.8 But the same, of course,
can be said for state courts of last resort that confront equally
important questions within their jurisdictional borders—to say nothing
of the smaller, local courts that decide matters of life and death.9 Still,
scholars exalt the federal bench as supreme—literally and figuratively.
Indoctrinated in a culture of Article III exceptionalism—a culture
birthed in the legal academy, no doubt—Article III judges have done
as good a job perpetuating their specialness as we scholars have.10
(explaining that transformation in federal appellate courts is “the by-product of the
effort to maintain a small, elite federal judiciary”).
5 As used throughout, “Article III exceptionalism” captures this broader
orientation toward the work and role of the federal courts; it has various component
parts—an attitude of elitism, the maintenance of a small federal bench, and the
concentration of judicial power and autonomy—that combine to entrench and
maintain Article III exceptionalism (as seen, especially, against Article I judges and
courts and state judges and courts).
6 With thanks to Brooke Coleman for first describing federal civil procedure as
“one percent procedure.” Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L.
REV. 1005, 1007 (2016) (arguing that “the federal civil litigation system is its own one
percent regime”).
7 See, e.g., Justin Weinsten-Tull, The Structures of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031,
1039-40 (2020) (noting that litigants filed more than 86 million cases in state and
local courts in 2015 and less than 350,000 cases in federal court).
8 See, e.g., Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228
(2022) (overruling Roe v. Wade and holding that there is no constitutional right to
terminate a pregnancy).
9 See, e.g., Nicole Summers, Civil Probation, 75 STAN. L. REV. ___, ___
(forthcoming
2023),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3897493 (discussing inequities in housing court proceedings); Colleen F. Shanahan,
Jessica K. Steinberg, Alyx Mark, & Anna E. Carpenter, The Institutional Mismatch of
State Civil Courts, 122 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (2022) (“The millions of people
who come to state civil courts each year in the United States are in crisis, and so, too,
are the courts that hear their cases.”).
10 See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CINN. L. REV. 615, 615 (1999) (recognizing that “melange of
glorification, celebration, and adoration that pervades much of popular and almost
all of academic thinking about the judiciary”).
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Federal judges wield enormous control over “macro-judging,” and
they have leveraged that control to maintain a self-interestedly
powerful, selective, and elite federal judiciary. That is, Article III
exceptionalism privileges the handful of big, important cases, while
delegating to others the pedestrian mass of common civil litigation
(often brought by unrepresented individuals and other marginalized
claimants). Consider, for example, the creation and maintenance of a
procedural triage system at the federal appellate level that permits the
courts of appeals to be exceedingly selective in how they distribute
their time and attention.11 That regime saves the best, most interesting
cases for judges, while central legal staff handle most of the rest. Judges
at the district-court level have relied on magistrates to handle much of
their civil docket—a lot of the work they deride as “housekeeping”12—
while seeking opportunities to serve on rules committees, obtain
multidistrict litigation (or “MDLs”), and do other high-profile work.13
These influences likewise may even partly explain why the Supreme
Court’s docket has shrunk over time,14 and why (some) Justices have
encouraged the development of a judicial cult of personality.15 Many
of the reforms—especially the rise of MDLs and the development of
a federal appellate triage system—may offer efficiency benefits.16 But
that’s not the whole story.
11 See, e.g., Merritt E. McAlister, Rebuilding the Federal Circuit Courts, 116 NW. U. L.
REV. 1137, 1159–61 (2022) (describing triage process); see also WILLIAM M. RICHMAN
& WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS IN CRISIS, at xii, 115 (2013) (describing changes in federal appellate court
structure and case processing to generate two “tracks” of appellate review as “judicial
activism of the highest order” and concluding that this “unilateral change in [their]
function . . . is deeply subversive of the entire constitutional scheme”) [hereinafter
RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE].
12 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal
Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990) (discussing how allocation of work among
various federal court constituencies—especially between “Article III” and “Article
I” judges—reflects value judgments about what work is “worthy” of Article III
courts) [hereinafter Resnik, Housekeeping].
13 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, MDL Revolution, 96
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2021) (“Being selected as an MDL judge confers elite status
on the judge in the ranks of the federal judiciary.”).
14 See, e.g., Michael Heise, Martin T. Wells & Dawn M. Chutkow, Does Docket Size
Matter? Revisiting Empirical Accounts of the Supreme Court’s Incredibly Shrinking Docket, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2020) (“Today’s Supreme Court decides markedly
fewer appeals than its predecessors. . . . During the last Term included in this study,
2017, the Court decided 68 appeals, which represents the fewest number of merits
decisions at any point since the mid-twentieth century.”).
15 See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It), 106 IOWA L.
REV. 181, 182 (2020) (identifying a “contributing cause” of the Supreme Court being
“broken” and having lost “[p]ublic confidence” is that “individual Justices have
become celebrities akin to the Kardashians”; “Television appearances, books,
movies, stump speeches, and separate opinions aimed at the Justices’ polarized fan
bases have created cults of personality around individual Justices.”).
16 We should be skeptical about efficiency claims, of course. See Brooke D.
Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1797 (2015) (questioning singleminded focus on efficiency calculations that privilege litigation cost only).
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This Article argues that there is a darker side to macro-judging—
one that, wittingly or not—has permitted judges to structure their
institution to increase judicial selectivity and autonomy. These reforms
have entrenched Article III exceptionalism; they have helped to
maintain a small, elite federal judiciary focused on only “important”
work—important, at least, in the eyes of the federal judiciary itself.
Perhaps Article III exceptionalism is a necessary feature to keep federal
judicial work sufficiently interesting, important, and influential to
continue to attract the kind of talent thought necessary and deserving
of a lifetime appointment on the federal bench. But it comes with
costs: do we want a federal bench focused only on the extraordinary,
big cases? And might such a focus lead Article III courts to think they
themselves are too “big” or “important” for modest or incremental
rulings? There is, this Article argues, a tangible risk that a culture of
federal judicial specialness and elitism nurtures something of an
attitude problem eschewing judicial restraint among the federal courts.
The signs that these risks are materializing abound. The Article III
judiciary sometimes thinks it is above the law. Consider, for example,
the persistent refusal of the Supreme Court to adopt ethics rules—a
position that maximizes judicial control over agenda-setting in a most
self-interested (and potentially quite pernicious) way.17 Or think of the
recent blockbuster reporting that more than one hundred lower-court
federal judges had violated federal law18 by failing to disqualify
themselves from cases where they (or close family) held a financial
interest in a party.19 Some Article III judges may think their own work
too important to be bogged down with ticky-tacky ethics obligations.
Today’s federal courts—at every level—are not shy in exercising
judicial power.20 A particularly muscular form of judicial supremacy
has seemingly gripped the courts.21 Within a one-month period in
17 See Bob Bauer, The Supreme Court Needs an Ethics Code, THE ATLANTIC (May
18, 2022), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/supreme-courtroe-leak-ethics-code/629884/ (discussing failure of the Supreme Court to adopt an
ethics code).
18 28 U.S.C. § 455(b).
19 James V. Grimaldi, Coulter Jones, & Joe Palazzo, 131 Federal Judges Broke the
Law by Hearing Cases Where They Had a Financial Interest, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 2021,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/131-federal-judges-broke-the-law-by-hearing-caseswhere-they-had-a-financial-interest-11632834421?mod=hp_lead_pos5.
20 See, e.g., Thomas P. Schmidt, Judicial Minimalism in the Lower Courts, 108 VA. L.
REV. 829, 831 (2022) (observing that “lower federal courts are active and
conspicuous these days”); Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What
The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 32 (2019) (observing that lower
federal courts have “now assumed enormous legal, political, and cultural
significance”).
21 Those on the political right, of course, would say this is nothing new. See, e.g.,
Matthew J. Franck, The Problem of Judicial Supremacy, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Spr. 2016,
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-problem-of-judicialsupremacy (arguing that Justice Anthony Kennedy’s decision finding a constitutional
right to same-sex marriage “exhibited judicial aggrandizement on a truly grand
scale”). Calls for judicial restraint flip-flop with the political winds of judicial
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spring of 2022, for example, the Supreme Court of the United States
appeared poised to overturn Roe v. Wade;22 a split panel of an
intermediate federal appellate court appeared ready to dismantle
administrative enforcement power;23 and a single district court judge
enjoined the nationwide operation of the Centers for Disease Control’s
COVID-19 pandemic mask mandate for airports, airplanes, and other
modes of interstate travel.24 Merits aside, each was (or would soon be)
a bold ruling. These sweeping decisions reflect the raw, muscular
power of the federal courts—each an example of what led progressives
to begin warning about the dangers of “judicial supremacy” at the turn
of the century.25 But debates over judicial supremacy from both sides
of the partisan divide26 often overlook how the construction of Article
III courts as exceptional may contribute to the muscular forms of
judicial supremacy they attack. By keeping the federal judiciary elite
and focused on only “important” work, courts have left the humility
of a more passive27 (and perhaps more minimalist)28 orientation in the
dust.
Article III judges may not be free to rule in ways that directly
benefit their own personal, familial, or financial interest, but they are
free to influence the structure of the judicial organization to maximize
appointments. See Jack M. Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial
Restraint: Judicial Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215, 215-16
(2019) (discussing shifts on judicial supremacy and restraint among liberals and
conservatives over time). The call for restraint is the constant.
22 Josh Gerstein & Alexander Ward, Supreme Court Has Voted to Overturn Abortion
Rights,
Draft
Opinion
Shows,
Politico,
May
2,
2022,
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draftopinion-00029473. And it did, of course. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
23 See Jarkesy v. S.E.C., No. 20-61007 (5th Cir. May 18, 2022).
24 Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Biden, No. 8:21-cv-01693, Order
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2022).
25 Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
149, 162 (2004).
26 These debates are of long-standing, of course, but are re-emerging in the wake
of Dobbs. See, e.g., Written Statement of Nikolas Bowie, Assistant Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School, The Contemporary Debate over Supreme Court Reform: Origins and
Perspectives, Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States, June
30, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/BowieSCOTUS-Testimony.pdf; Nikolas Bowie & Daphna Renan, The Supreme Court Is Not
Supposed to Have This Much Power, THE ATLANTIC, June 8, 2022,
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/supreme-court-poweroverrule-congress/661212/.
27 See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) (recognizing
that “courts are essentially passive instruments of government”).
28 The minimalism on which I focus here is what Thomas Schmidt has recently
defined as “decisional minimalism,” “which counsel judges to decide cases on narrow
and shallow grounds.” Schmidt, supra note 20, at 836. Schmidt notes that his
description of “decisional minimalism” follows Cass Sunstein’s work most closely.
Id. (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3-6 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110
HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-10 (1996)).
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their own power and control. That courts might ever exercise their
power to preserve and perpetuate their own specialness is sobering,29
but also undoubtedly true.30 Courts have freer rein from institutional
norms when engaging in macro-judging—that is, when deciding how
the courts should operate, as opposed to deciding the outcome in a
case.31 Across the federal judiciary—from the bankruptcy court to the
Supreme Court—macro-judging has increased judicial autonomy.
These structural choices permit judges to focus only on “important”
matters worthy of their attention; they give judges more power and
influence; and, for some, they create opportunities for prominent
speaking gigs, lucrative book deals, and even television appearances.
Macro-judging, in short, can be used to perpetuate and maintain the
exceptionalism of Article III and its judges.
This work seeks to make two main contributions to the federal
courts and judicial decisionmaking literature. The first is to define a
field of judicial decisionmaking concerned with “macro-judging.”32
29 See Gregory C. Sisk, Judges Are Human, Too, 83 JUDICATURE 178, 211 (2000)
(observing that empirical studies of judicial behavior are “sobering splash in the face
with cold reality”).
30 The reputational or self-interested concerns may motivate judicial
decisionmaking is now well established. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise
& Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 63, 64-65 (2005); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss,
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1487-93 (1998); Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical
Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 13, 14 (1992); Mark A.
Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s “Unconstitutional” About the Sentencing
Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 188-90, 193 (1991); see also LAWRENCE BAUM,
JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006)
(testing empirically claim that Republican appointees to the Supreme Court who are
new to the Washington, D.C. scene drift left over time to improve their reputation
in national media outlets—the so-called “Greenhouse effect,” named after longtime
New York Times Supreme Court reporter, Linda Greenhouse); Lawrence Baum &
Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO.
L.J. 1515, 1574-79 (2010); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 3–4 (1993) (“Politics,
personal friendships, ideology, and pure serendipity play too large a role in the
appointment of federal judges to warrant treating the judiciary as a collection of
genius-saints miraculously immune to the tug of self-interest.”).
31 Richard Epstein has recognized that in (what I now call “macro-judging”)
judges “are not subject to any exceptional constraints.” Richard A. Epstein, The
Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
827, 837.
32 I use “macro-judging,” in part, because, as Marin Levy has observed, the term
“judicial administration” “has fallen out of favor.” Marin K. Levy, Judging Justice on
Appeal, 123 YALE L.J. 2386, 2390 n.14 (2014). Crediting Guido Calabresi with the
insight, Levy suggests we think of work like this as part of a “new legal process”
school. Id. I certainly like that term, too, but I use “macro-judging” to refer to what
judges—and not academics—do. I use “macro-judging” to focus, in particular, on
judicial decisions that reflect structural or systemic choices undertaken collectively as
a matter of institution building and judicial policy; these are choices likely not
attributable to any one particular judge, nor do these decisions drive any particular
case outcome—all of which I would describe as “micro-judging.” Academic work
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Most judicial decisionmaking literature focuses instead on what I call
“micro-judging”—that is, what explains judges’ decisions in particular
cases (e.g., “the law,” the attitudes or experiences of judges, the
structure or collegiality of a court).33 Academic work on micro-judging
involves theoretical and empirical accounts of how and why judges
decide cases the way they do. At bottom, “micro-judging” operates,
primarily, at the case-specific level. “Macro-judging,” on the other
hand, involves court structure and influences at a higher level of
abstraction. It centers judicial policymaking, institutional design, court
structure, and how judges engage in their work.34 Macro-judging can
be formal (e.g., the creation of federal rules or local rules), informal
(e.g., the Supreme Court’s dwindling merits docket), or somewhere in
between (e.g., a recommendation from the Judicial Conference, which
is the policy-making body of the federal courts, to Congress).
Second, it collects and centers existing academic critiques from
disparate domains—federal courts, civil procedure, and bankruptcy,
among others—around a core framework: Article III exceptionalism.
It argues that most of the significant “macro-judging” reforms of the
last half-century have all advanced and entrenched the specialness of
Article III courts; as a result, the federal courts have become more
elite, selective, and autonomous. Through macro-judging, they’ve
redefined what is worthy of Article III attention and what is not;
they’ve established and exercised their own priorities in casemanagement—priorities that may, at times, conflict with the overall
public good or exalt judicial priorities over public service.
Scholars have critiqued various aspects of the practices I discuss
here, but this Article is the first to offer a comprehensive account of
how and in what ways the federal courts have, themselves, undertaken
large-scale procedural reforms to entrench their own power and
autonomy—all while enriching their own job experience. This Article
argues that federal judges at every level have engaged in macrothat focuses on questions of judicial institutional design—including in its most
formal incarnation, the development of trans-substantive rules—would fall into the
“macro-judging” bucket.
33 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, MARGARET H. LEMOS, ANDREW D. MARTIN, TOM S.
CLARK, ALLISON ORR LARSEN, & ANNA HARVEY, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING: A
COURSEBOOK 1 (2020) (explaining that the study of judicial decisionmaking
examines “internal” and “external” influences on “how judges reach their decisions
or the factors that influence the content of judge-made law”).
34 Some may disagree with describing “macro-judging” as a form of “judging,”
in so far as macro-level decisions do not directly determine any case outcome (the
latter being the province of micro-judging). I use “judging” capaciously to encompass
all aspects of judicial decisionmaking; by doing so, I’m also rejecting a more
formalistic distinction between deciding a case and designing an institution that
(ultimately) will decide a case. Both, I argue, are part of the judicial process, but only
one (macro-judging) is subject to plenary control and oversight by Congress. And
that’s especially important because it means that if the courts have used macrojudging to further judicial priorities over the public good, then Congress can realign
those priorities through reforms that revise and revisit macro-judging.
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judging—that is, have shaped the institution of judging itself—to
maintain the power and prestige of the Article III judiciary. The macrojudging features I examine all entrench and maintain judicial prestige,
give judges greater control over their work, increase that work’s
sophistication, attract more recognition for it, or some combination
thereof. Where the rewards of federal judicial service are
remuneratively slight (at least compared with private sector legal work),
the urge to increase the intrinsic worth of the federal judicial post—
that is, the power and influence of the position—may be especially
great. That many federal judges stay active on the bench long past
retirement age suggests that federal judicial power is both rewarding in
and of itself and, perhaps, even a bit intoxicating.
I do not focus on macro-judging and Article III exceptionalism to
cast aspersions on the federal judiciary. Instead, I think it important to
be skeptical and critical of judicial institutions—and to resist the urge
to romanticize or canonize the federal judiciary.35 Judges are human;36
like the rest of us, they seek power, influence, and rewarding work.
Moreover, some of the features of the exceptional Article III courts
may be normatively desirable. But, I argue, ultimately, that’s all for
Congress—and not the courts themselves—to decide. The democratic
process should set macro-judging priorities; it should not be the other
way around. This Article argues for re-invigorated congressional
oversight of macro-judging, especially where such judicial decisions
subordinate marginalized litigants, where market forces may not
operate to correct for inequities, or where macro-judging undermines
judicial restraint across all levels of the federal judiciary.
It’s also entirely possible that many of the macro-judging features
discussed in this Article developed solely for benign and beneficial
reasons—and that judicial self-interest in prestige, power, and
autonomy has nothing to do with macro-judging. That’s the more
traditional narrative about the federal courts, even while some question
whether scholars have inflated the field’s own sense of its importance.37
This Article considers a counter-narrative that may be controversial
and contested. I may be wrong—indeed, in some ways I hope I’m
wrong about the motivations and effects of macro-judging—but I
think it’s important, nevertheless, to ventilate this argument in the
35 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 10, at 624 (observing that the “romantic ideal” of
the judiciary—that is, the “image of a as someone largely lacking in self-interest”—
has been “cultivated by the judiciary, celebrated by the culture of lawyers and law
school, and accepted by most members of the public”).
36 See, e.g., Tom S. Clark, Benjamin G. Engst, Jeffrey K. Staton, Estimating the
Effect of Leisure on Judicial Performance, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 349 (2018) (“One of the
most significant lessons of the social science of law and courts during the 20th
century might be summarized as follows: judges are people too.”).
37 On this front, I note that a recent survey of law professors indicates that
federal courts, appellate practice, and constitutional law are three of the four most
over-rated (or “over-central”) fields in law schools. See Eric Martinez & Kevin Tobia,
What Do Law Professors Believe about Law and the Legal Academy? An Empirical Inquiry,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4182521 (manuscript at 44).
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ongoing conversation around federal court reform and judicial
legitimacy.
This Article will proceed in three parts. The first part situates the
work of the Article III judge. This discussion focuses on the judge as
an exceptional worker within a unique workplace—one that may,
unwittingly perhaps, encourage and maintain that culture of elitism.
The second part identifies features of the federal judicial system at
every level—from the Supreme Court to the bankruptcy court—where
judges have engaged in macro-judging to maintain Article III power,
prestige, and autonomy. The final part launches a normative critique
of Article III exceptionalism and macro-judging and offers some
prescriptive considerations—aimed, especially, at identifying where
legislative intervention may be most needed to combat the harms of
Article III exceptionalism and reinvigorate the public-service mission
of the federal courts.
I. THE ARTICLE III JUDGE
This Part defines the Article III judge. It describes the federal judge
both as a constitutional actor and a federal worker. We rarely think
about the judge as a federal worker, but that workplace’s unique
structure, this Article argues, shapes the ways in which judges exercise
their constitutional judicial power. Throughout this Part, I contrast the
role of the “Article III judge” with the role of other appointees within
the federal adjudicatory system38—generally referred to as “Article I
judges.”39 This comparison is essential to the narrative of Article III
exceptionalism.

38 By “federal adjudicatory system,” I mean the entire federal governmental
apparatus engaged in receiving evidence, applying law to facts, and rendering legally
binding decisions on the rights, benefits, and obligations of the parties before them.
See Resnik, Housekeeping, supra note 12, at 911 (similarly using term “federal
adjudication”).
39 Throughout, I generally use the terms “Article III judge” and “federal judge”
interchangeably to refer only to those judges appointed consistent with the
requirements of Article III of the U.S. Constitution. I refer to any judicial
appointment not satisfying those requirements by either that position’s title or,
collectively, by “Article I judges.” That said, there’s arguably some inaccuracy in the
convenient shorthand. First, there’s a debate over whether some adjuncts to Article
III appointees—bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges—should be understood as
“Article I” judges, in the sense that they do not serve within legislative courts (as
administrative law judges do). See id. at 910 & n.6 (discussing “imprecise” and
“arguably, technically inaccurate” term, but using it as a matter of convenience).
Additionally, Congress created some Article I judges using other legislative powers—
like the exercise of Article IV plenary power over the territories. See F. Andrew
Hessick, Consenting to Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. REV. 715,
763 n.5 (2018) (explaining inaccuracy and using similar terminology to avoid
“awkward[ness]” of “non-Article III tribunals”).
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A.

As Constitutional Actor

Even by the yardstick of constitutional text, Article III is “spare.”40
It “vest[s]” the “judicial Power of the United States” in “one Supreme
Court” and “such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.”41 Furthermore, “judges”—“both of the
supreme and inferior courts”—are to “hold their offices during good
behaviour” and receive “compensation . . . not to be diminished during
their continuance in office.”42 When it comes to the Article III judge,
that’s basically it as a matter of constitutional text.43 Although there’s a
rich body of scholarship on what “judicial power” means,44 and on
whom may exercise it,45 what matters for our purposes is that Article
III creates a constitutional judicial officer whose defining attributes are
a protected salary46 and a protected job.47 These provisions were
thought necessary to afford federal judges the independence to

40 Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 210 (1985) (“Article III lays out the structure
and scope of the federal judiciary in spare and succinct language.”).
41 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
42 Id.
43 The president’s appointment power specifically refers to the appointment of
judges to the Supreme Court. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
44 For a classic treatment of the topic of “judicial power,” see A. Leo Levin &
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in
Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958), and for a more contemporary
examination of some of these issues, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare
Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE
L.J. 1535 (2000).
45 For a thorough account of the constitutional issues surrounding Article I
courts and judges, see Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990) (proposing theories to
justify Article I tribunals); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural
Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV L. REV. 1153, 1186-90 (1992)
(arguing that Article III permits no exceptions in vesting judicial power); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 915, 917-18 (1988) (developing a theory of appellate review to accommodate
the Court’ exceptions to Article III); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III
Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643 (2004) (arguing
that a distinction between “inferior courts” and “inferior tribunals” justifies
constitutional exceptions to vesting of “judicial power”).
46 Article III judicial pay is “undiminishable.” O’Donoghue v. United States 289
U.S. 516, 529-30 (1933).
47 Although “[i]t is a virtually unquestioned assumption among constitutional
law cognoscenti that impeachment is the only means of removing a federal judge,”
the constitutional text does not “expressly” say so. Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D.
Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE L.J. 72, 74 (2006). The provision for
tenure “during good behaviour” has generally been construed to require removal
only through impeachment within the meaning Article II, section 4. Id. But others
have argued that Congress has the power, through the Necessary and Proper Clause,
to “establish any number of mechanisms for determining whether a judge has
forfeited her office through misbehavior.” Id. at 78.
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perform their constitutional function.48 Others without those
protections may also wield constitutional “judicial power” in some
circumstances,49 but those non-constitutional actors do so with less
independence, for less money, and with less prestige.
There are currently 870 authorized Article III judgeships.50 Nine
of those Article III appointees sit atop the federal judicial hierarchy at
the Supreme Court of the United States.51 Another 179 authorized
federal appellate judges are spread out across twelve geographic
circuits and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—courts
ranging in size from six to twenty-nine judges.52 And there are 673
authorized Article III appointees to the U.S. District Courts,53 which
are organized into 94 districts in every state, the District of Columbia,
and four territories (Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands). Lastly, there are nine judges appointed to
lifetime posts on the U.S. Court of International Trade.54
There are many more Article III judges than that, however. In
1919, Congress gave Article III judges who had reached retirement age
the opportunity to take what is now known as “senior status.”55
See id. at 87 (“After all, the purpose of good-behavior tenure, as well as the
bar against diminishing judicial salaries, was surely to protect judicial
independence.”); see also O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 531 (“The anxiety of the framers of
the Constitution to preserve the independence especially of the judicial department
is manifested by the provision now under review, forbidding the diminution of the
compensation of the judges of courts exercising the judicial power of the United
States.”).
49 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-70
(1982) (recognizing “three narrow situations not subject to th[e] command” that “the
judicial power of the United States must be vested in Art. III courts”).
50
Authorized Judgeships, Admin. Office of U.S. Cts., at 8
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/allauth.pdf [hereinafter “Authorized
Judgeships”].
51 A point of some recent debate, of course. Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman,
How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 169 (2019) (arguing that significant
reform is required to save the Supreme Court); Opinion, How to Fix the Supreme
Court, N.Y. Times (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2020/10/27/opinion/supreme-court-reform.html.
52 Authorized Judgeships, supra note 45, at 8.
53 Id. Ten of the appointees to the district court bench are in “temporary”
positions, which only means that the position is temporary but not the appointment;
accordingly, when the life-appointee filling the post steps down, he or she may not
be replaced. Bruce Moyer, Will Congress Add More Federal Judgeships?, FED. LAW., June
2009, at 10 (“Temporary means that when the judge appointed retires or dies, the
position would not be refilled.”).
54 Authorized Judgeships, supra note 45, at 8. For more on the U.S. Court of
International Trade and the unique issues related to its status as an Article III court,
see Jane Restani & Ira Bloom, The Nippon Quagmire: Article III Courts and Finality of
United States Court of International Trade Decisions, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1005 (2014).
55 By statute, this is called retirement on “senior status.” 28 U.S.C. § 371. For a
thorough discussion of the incentives surrounding “taking senior status,” see Marin
K. Levy, The Promise of Senior Judges, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2021). I’ve simplified
the requirements for obtaining the salary of the office and annual cost-of-living
adjustments here, but for a full accounting of the history of senior status and its
48
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“Senior judges” are “a special class of judges who have left regular
active service,” but who continue to take on judicial work—on average
40% to 50% of the normal work for an active judge.56 Taking senior
status creates a judicial vacancy that the president can fill, thereby
adding to the ranks of Article III judges without expanding the number
of authorized judgeships.57 “Senior judges” are still Article III judges
but, instead of a salary, they receive a pension in the amount currently
set for their office (which carries tax benefits).58 Senior judges currently
handle approximately 20 percent of the total federal judicial
workload,59 and there are hundreds of them providing valuable service
throughout the federal bench.
Despite the hierarchical structure of the federal courts, as Amanda
Frost has observed, “[a]s a constitutional matter, Article III judges are
treated alike, in that they all benefit from the same life tenure and
compensation guarantees, and they all exercise the same ‘judicial
Power.’”60 Justices can serve on lower courts, while lower court judges
sit by designation on other lower courts.61 At some level, a federal
judge is a federal judge is a federal judge—the only real difference is
the posture of the case before him or her and the geographic or
subject-matter scope of his or her jurisdiction.
The Article III judiciary depends, quite literally, on a fleet of Article
I decisionmakers to help Article III courts handle federal adjudication.
Nearest to the Article III courts are two vital “units” of the district

requirements and benefits, see Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager & Gregory
Ablavsky, Leaving the Bench, 1970-2009: The Choices Federal Judges Make, What Influences
Those Choices, and Their Consequences, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2012).
56 Levy, supra note 55, at 1232; see Burbank, et al., supra note 55, at 29; see also
Frederic Block, Senior Status: An “Active” Senior Judge Corrects Some Common
Misunderstandings, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 533, 540 (2007).
57 28 U.S.C. § 371(d). For this reason, Marin K. Levy has argued that providing
inducements, and eliminating barriers or disadvantages to taking senior status, offer
one potentially significant way to expand the federal appellate courts (without doing
so through additions of authorized judgeships). See generally Levy, supra note 50.
58 See Levy, supra note 55, at 1243 (discussing tax advantages); see also infra notes
112-119 and accompanying text (discussing same).
59
About Federal Judges, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/about-federal-judges (last visited July
14, 2022).
60 Amanda Frost, Judicial Ethics and Supreme Court Exceptionalism, 26 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 443, 469 (2013).
61 See id. (“In fact, Justices can and do serve as judges on the lower courts. In
other words, the Supreme Court's special constitutional status as an institution does
not translate into special constitutional status for the Justices.”); see generally Marin K.
Levy, Visiting Judges, 107 CAL. L. REV. 67 (2019) (discussing qualitative and
quantitative data to discuss practice of visiting judges sitting by designation on the
federal appellate courts).
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court: the bankruptcy judge62 and the magistrate judge.63 At one time,
neither was considered a “judge”64 at all—a marker meant to
distinguish them from the real Article III judiciary alongside which
they sit. Today, both wield a complicated version of federal judicial
power—resulting from a somewhat incoherent constitutional
doctrine65—and have a title befitting their role, even if they lack the
power, prestige, and protection of Article III judges.
In 1978, Congress overhauled federal bankruptcy law and created
the federal bankruptcy judge. Originally, these judges were to be
appointed by the president for fourteen-year terms and given “the
powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty,”66 but the Supreme
Court swiftly struck down that provision as an unconstitutional vesting
of Article III judicial power in Article I judges.67 After a protracted
“battle between the bankruptcy bar and Article III judges,”68 Congress
eventually passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, under which bankruptcy judges would hold office for
fourteen-year terms upon appointment by the U.S. Court of Appeals
in which the bankruptcy judges sit.69 That act bifurcated the
jurisdiction of existing bankruptcy courts into “core” and “non-core”
bankruptcy proceedings; only in the latter could a bankruptcy judge
issue a final order.70 The distinction proved beguiling, and, ultimately,

28 U.S.C. § 151 (“In each judicial district, the bankruptcy judges in regular
active service shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the
bankruptcy court for that district. Each bankruptcy judge, as a judicial officer of the
district court, may exercise the authority conferred under this chapter with respect
to any action, suit, or proceeding and may preside alone and hold a regular or special
session of the court, except as otherwise provided by law or by rule or order of the
district court.”).
63 Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 401(b), 82 Stat. 1107, 1118
(1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 631).
64 See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts,
62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 803 (2010) (noting that bankruptcy judges were initially known
as “bankruptcy referee[s]”); Resnik, Trial, supra note 5, at 989 (noting that magistrate
judges were not originally called “judges”).
65 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall,
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 185 (describing rule in Stern, which holds that a bankruptcy
judge cannot enter a final judgment consistent with the limitations of Article III, as
“mak[ing] little sense and can be understood only as the Court following in a
formalistic way a series of decisions that themselves make little sense”).
66 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (repealed 1984).
67 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57-87 (1982)
(holding that broad grant of authority to bankruptcy judges violates Article III and
that the “judicial Power of the United States” must be exercised by judges with life
tenure and salary protection).
68 Linda Coco, Stigma, Prestige and the Cultural Context of Debt: A Critical Analysis of
the Bankruptcy Judge’s Non-Article III Status, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 181, 183 (2011).
69 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1).
70 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 340.
62
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the Supreme Court mired its constitutionality in doubt that remains to
this day.71
The history and trajectory of the federal magistrate judge is similar;
indeed, the magistrate was modeled after the bankruptcy referee, the
predecessor to today’s bankruptcy judge.72 Introduced as “magistrates”
in 1968,73 these non-Article III judges were originally conceived of as
“assistants to district judges.”74 Most of the first magistrates were parttime—reflecting their assistant-like status—but in the years since both
their numbers, position, and powers have grown.75 Magistrates were
renamed “magistrate judges” in 1990,76 and, today, magistrate judges
may do all the work of a district court judge except conduct trials for
and sentence felony defendants or authorize wiretaps.77 Unless the
magistrate judge acts with the consent of the parties,78 he or she may
only make “proposed findings of fact and recommendations” to an
Article III district judge for resolution of case-dispositive motions.79
Full-time magistrate judges serve renewable eight-year terms, and they
are appointed (and renewed) by a majority vote of the district judges
of the court.80 So long as the services of their office remain needed, a
magistrate judge is removable “only for incompetency, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability.”81
Justice Sonia Sotomayor—herself a former district court judge—
once remarked that without magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges
“the work of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.”82
No doubt. The number of these Article III adjuncts exceeds the
number of active Article III judges, and they do more work, too. There
are 345 authorized and funded bankruptcy judgeships.83 In 2021, those
71 See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). See Mawerdi Hamid, Constitutional
Authority of Bankruptcy Judges: The Effects of Stern v. Marshall as Applied by the Courts of
Appeals, 27 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 51, 53 (2019) (“Stern has left lower courts and
litigants without clear guidance on the authority of a bankruptcy judge when finally
determining core proceedings.”).
72 Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. LEG. 343, 348
(1979) (observing that magistrate bill was “patterned after the existing statutory
arrangements for referees in bankruptcy”).
73 Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 401(b), 82 Stat. 1107, 1118
(1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 631). Federal magistrates grew out of the
United States commissioners system, which had existed for 175 years. See McCabe,
supra note 63, at 345 (discussing origins of modern magistrate judge).
74 Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at 989.
75 Id.
76 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 1-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089,
5117.
77 28 U.S.C. § 636; 18 U.S.C. § 3401.
78 Id. § 636(c)(1)
79 Id. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B).
80 Id. § 631(a).
81 Id. § 631(i).
82 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 668 (2015).
83 Status of Bankruptcy Judgeships—Judicial Business 2021, Admin. Off. of the
U.S.
Courts,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/status-bankruptcyjudgeships-judicial-business-2021.
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judges received more than 400,000 new filings—nearly 100,000 more
than the civil filings their Article III colleagues received—and they
terminated twice as many cases as the district courts.84 The total
number of active magistrate judges (673)85—including part-time86 and
recalled87 magistrates—is equivalent to the number of authorized
Article III district court judgeships (673).88 As Tracey E. George and
Albert H. Yoon have observed, “[t]he impact of magistrate judges is
substantial whether measured in the raw number of cases in which they
are involved or in the nature of the work they do”; indeed, they
routinely resolve three times the number of matters that district court
judges do.89
The bankruptcy judge and magistrate judge are just the tip of the
Article I judicial iceberg. As of March 1, 2017, there were 1,931 federal
administrative law judges90 spread across more than 30 agencies.91
There are approximately 600 immigration judges sitting on 68
immigration courts throughout the country92 and another 23 appellate
immigration judges on the Board of Immigration Appeals.93 Each
84 Compare Bankruptcy Filings, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts, tbl.F (Dec. 31,
2021), with Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts,
tbl. C-1 (Dec. 31, 2021). This has generally always been true; Judith Resnik observed
in 2000 that bankruptcy judges “have a larger docket than do other judges within
Article III and do much of their work without review.” Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at
952 n.96.
85 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS tbl.12 (2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/statusmagistrate-judge-positions-and-appointments-judicial-business-2021.
86 Under 28 U.S.C. § 631(c), with the approval of the Judicial Conference, a clerk
or deputy clerk of a court also may be appointed as a part-time magistrate judge.
Those appointed to a part-time position serve a four-year (as opposed to an eightyear) term. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 631 (appointment and tenure procedures for
magistrate judges).
87 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(h) (authorizing judicial council of the circuit to recall
retired magistrate judges upon consent of the district court’s chief judge).
88 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, ADDITIONAL
AUTHORIZED
JUDGESHIPS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
districtauth.pdf
89 See Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Article I Judges in an Article III World:
The Career Path of Magistrate Judges, 16 NEV. L. J. 823, 824-25 (2016) (discussing
importance of magistrate judges and their work).
90 That counts those appointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 to conduct administrative
proceedings in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 556 & 557.
91 ALJs by Agency, Federal Administrate Law Judges by agency and level
(EHRI-SDM as of March 2017), Office of Personnel Management,
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url
=ALJs-by-Agency. Unfortunately, more recent statistics are not available from the
Office of Personnel Management.
92 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chiefimmigration-judge.
93 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Board of
Immigration Appeals, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals.
For a thorough discussion of the history of the immigration judge, see Nicole
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wields federal adjudicatory power.94 They resolve more federal law
matters than the rest of the Article III judiciary combined; indeed, the
backlog of cases pending before immigration judges alone hit nearly
1.1 million in 2020.95 And there are still more: judges on military courts,
hearing officers, special masters on the Vaccine Court, and judges on
the Court of Federal Claims, to name a few.
There’s a rich body of law and scholarship on the constitutional
bounds of allocating federal judicial work to non-Article III
decisionmakers.96 That’s largely beyond the scope of this Article. What
matters is that there are layers, upon layers, of decisionmakers
throughout the federal adjudicatory system. My focus is on how the
distribution and allocation of federal adjudicatory work reinforces the
power, prestige, and autonomy of Article III courts. The construction
of Article III exceptionalism begins with the construction of a
differentiated and variegated federal judicial workforce. The next part
discusses the Article III judge as a worker within that workforce.
B.

As Federal Worker

Being an Article III judge is also a job; it’s work. It’s a good—
indeed, an excellent—job, to be sure. Job satisfaction among Article III
judges appears to be quite high given that many labor well past
retirement age and do so largely for free. But it comes with unique
constraints and rewards that are worth considering in some depth to
understand why judges might be inclined to engage in macro-judging
to entrench Article III exceptionalism. I’ll discuss the job’s features
along two dimensions: those features external and internal to the work
of judging.97 “External” features include judicial pay, policies, and
Sequeira Tashovski, Immigration Judge Independence Under Attack: A Call to Re-Evaluate
the Current Method of IJ Appointment and Create a Separate Immigration Court System, 19
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 173 (2022).
94 Not all are classified as “administrative law judges” for purposes of the
Administrative Procedures Act. See Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at 954 & n. 102
(discussing role of immigration judge among other administrative judges not
classified as “ALJs”).
95 Courts in Crisis: The State of Judicial Independence and Due Process in U.S. Immigration
Courts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. & Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3, 4 (2020) (statement of Hon. A. Ashley Tabaddor, President,
National Association of Immigration Judges); see also Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections unpon
the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1343 (1992) (stating that
“ALJs probably decide more ‘cases’ each year than do their federal judicial
counterparts”).
96 For a discussion of constitutional issues surrounding Article I or legislative
courts, see generally, Richard Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, And
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915 (1988); Daniel Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative
Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. L. J. 291 (1990); Resnik, Mythic, supra note 3.
97 Workplace theorists sometimes describe worker motivation along two
dimensions: extrinsic factors, which are things like company policies, pay,
supervision, status, and security; and intrinsic factors, which are things like
achievement, recognition for achievement, responsibility, and growth. See generally
FREDERICK HERZBERG, ET AL., THE MOTIVATION TO WORK (1959); Frederick
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security; “internal” features include the nature of the work itself, as
well as the capacity for recognition, autonomy, and growth or
advancement.98
1. External Features of Federal Judicial Work
Although the position of a federal judge is often static, it is
incredibly secure. Federal judges can’t be fired—only removed
through impeachment.99 Congress can decline to give federal judges
raises, but it cannot do so selectively.100 The pay is good, relatively
speaking,101 and the retirement perks are even better.102 Sure, Article
III judges could earn more in private law practice, but such work
comes with less autonomy, longer hours, and far less security. Table 1
compares salaries for Article III and Article I judges; no Article I judge
earns more than an Article III judge.
Table 1: Article III103 and Article I Judges’ Salaries
Position

Salary (2022)

Chief Justice of the
United States

$286,700

Associate Justices of the
United States

$274,200

Circuit Judges

$236,900

Herzberg, On More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?, 81 HARV. BUS. REV. 8
(2003); see also FREDERICK HERZBERG, WORK AND THE NATURE OF MAN (1966); see
also Mohammed Alshmemri, Lina Shahwan-Akl, & Phillip Maude, Herzberg’s TwoFactor Theory, 14 Life Science Journal 12, 13 (vol. 5, 2017) (“Herzberg’s theory is one
of the most significant content theories in job satisfaction.”).
98 Herzberg, One More Time, supra note 97, at 8-9.
99 U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.
100 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 S.M.U.
L. Rev. 469, 472-73 (1998) (discussing federal judicial constraints).
101 All of this is relative, of course, and it shouldn’t go unremarked that the
current salary for a federal district court judge is more than six times the national per
capita income average according to the U.S. Census. Compare Admin. Office of U.S.
Courts,
Judicial
Compensation,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judgesjudgeships/judicial-compensation (2021 compensation for district court judge is
$218,600), with U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/US/SEX255219 (2019 per capita income is $34,103). The
average income for a law firm partner at one of the nation’s top 200 law firms
exceeded $1 million in 2019. See Debra Cassens Weiss, How Much Do Partners Make?
The Average at Large Law Firms Tops $1M, Survey Finds, ABA JOURNAL,
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/how-much-do-partners-make-theaverage-at-larger-firms-tops-1m-survey-finds (Dec. 16, 2020).
102 See infra notes 112-119 and accompanying text (discussing tax incentives for
taking senior status).
103
Admin. Off. of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Compensation,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation.
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District Judges

$223,400

Bankruptcy Judges104

$205,528

Magistrate Judges105

up to $205,528

Administrative Law
Judges106

$117,600 to $176,300

Immigration Judges107

Capped at $187,300

There are some limits on how federal judges can use (and not use)
their office. They generally may not rule in cases where they have a
direct financial interest,108 and their income has nothing to do with the
quantity or the quality of the cases they resolve.109 They may not
practice law, nor engage in political activity.110 There are limits on how
much active judges may earn for outside activities, like teaching (but
they may keep all book royalties).111
Although judges cannot be forced to retire, the financial incentives
for doing so—or for taking senior status—can be substantial. Once
federal judges reach the age of 65, and have sufficient years of federal
judicial service,112 they may either retire with a full pension—equivalent
to the judge’s current salary113—or take “senior status” and continue
to receive the salary of the judicial office.114 Those judges who take
“senior status” receive pension payments equivalent to their judicial
salary that are not subject to FICA (Social Security and Medicare) taxes,
and some state and local taxing authorities treat senior status salaries

104

judges)

See 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (setting salary of bankruptcy judges at 92% of district

Id. § 634(a) (setting salary of magistrate judges at up to 92% of district judges).
E.O. 14061, Adjustments of Certain Rates of Pay, Schedule 10, at 13,
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/payexecutive-order-2022-adjustments-of-certain-rates-of-pay.pdf. (setting scale for
Administrative Law Judges).
107 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, 2020
Immigration
Judge
Pay
Rates,
Jan.
5,
2020,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1236526/download (noting that pay is
capped at Level III of the Executive Schedule, which is currently $187,300).
108 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4).
109 See Drahozal, supra note 100, at 473 (discussing constraints on Article III
judges).
110 See Burbank, et al., supra note 55, at 4 (discussing constraints on Article III
judicial service).
111 The cap is 15%. 5 U.S.C. App. § 501.
112 See 28 U.S.C. § 371(c). This is known as the “rule of 80”; the judge’s age and
years of service must add up to 80 to trigger retirement benefits. Accordingly, a judge
who is appointed to the bench later in life (say, at 55), may retire once her age and
years of service add up to 80.
113 By statute, this is called “retirement on salary.” 28 U.S.C. 371(a). A judge
might also resign without a pension, but this is rare.
114 By statute, this is called retirement on “senior status.” 28 U.S.C. § 371.
105
106
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as retirement (reducing taxes further).115 All told, the financial benefit
for senior status (or retirement) is “between $25,000 to $30,000” or
more than 10% of the current salary for Article III judges.116 Moreover,
senior status judges who meet the workload certification to maintain a
salary for life, which is currently 25%, are not subject to any limit on
teaching income.117 Overall, the incentive for continuing to work in
some capacity in retirement (as opposed to retiring on pension
outright) is somewhat slight (at least today).118 It’s largely the difference
between keeping the judge’s current salary at retirement and any future
salary increases for the office.119
All this to say: even if federal judicial pay is not particularly great
(compared to the private sector), the financial rewards long-term are
significant and secure. But it’s reasonable to conclude that, as a group,
judges are less likely to be motivated by financial rewards than the
public at large; any judge could earn far more in private practice (or
even academia).120 That is likewise consistent with popular workplace
motivation theories: judges may become dissatisfied with their job
because of their pay (and some do),121 but financial rewards are not
themselves likely to be independently rewarding.122 Those rewards, as
the next part discusses, are more likely to come from the work itself.
See Burbank, et al., supra note 55, at 33 (discussing tax benefits for senior status
judges).
116 Id. at 34. Judges who take senior status may continue to receive the same life
insurance, health insurance, and survivor benefits, but they may no longer participate
in the Thrift Savings Plan, which is the Article III equivalent of a 401(k). Id. at 34-35
(discussing consequences of taking senior status).
117 5 U.S.C. app § 501(a)(1).
118 The financial difference between going senior (and thus qualifying for
continued raises and cost of living adjustments) and retirement was particularly steep
during the latter half of the Twentieth Century, when judge pay had been frozen and
Congress periodically failed to make even cost of living adjustments. See Burbank, et
al., supra note 55, at 33-34 (discussing history of judicial pay). Judges who take senior
status also are free from the ordinary restriction on teaching income imposed on
judges who are in active service. See 5a U.S.C. § 502(b). The same tax advantages for
federal judges to retire upon eligibility apply, regardless of whether the judge takes
senior status or not, but the incentive (especially given the relative dissatisfaction with
judicial pay) may be enough to encourage judges to take senior status early, even
when they desire to continue working at a full or almost full capacity. See Burbank, et
al., supra note 55, at 45-47 (discussing strategy around taking senior status and tax
advantages, including considering survey responses from federal judges).
119 The benefit of going senior (as opposed to remaining active), mostly inures
to the president and the court itself, as the president may appoint a new judge to fill
the senior judge’s seat upon retirement in senior status. For an evaluation of the
constitutionality of this scheme, see David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges
Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 453 (2007).
120 That is not to suggest that pecuniary rewards play no role in a judicial utility
function or are not a part of what judges want. See Posner, Maximize, supra note 30,
at 31-34 (including income/financial rewards in judicial utility function to assess
whether changes in income affect judicial behavior).
121 See infra notes 141-147 and accompanying text (discussing reasons federal
judges leave the bench).
122 Herzberg, One More Time, supra note 97, at 8-9.
115
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2. Internal Features of Federal Judicial Work
They say that true satisfaction comes from within—in this case,
from the satisfaction of the work itself.123 It’s not the pay, or the
retirement benefits, or probably even the job security that draws
highly-qualified applicants to seek Article III appointments: it’s the
rewards—and the power, responsibility, and prestige—of the work.
Judges likely value the ability to make meaningful decisions, to use their
reasoning and analytical skills to shape the development of law or
affect the lives of people in their community. That their work is
consequential, and often varied—at least according to subject matter
if not, strictly speaking, according to task—no doubt provides further
enrichment. It’s also likely true that judges who can act more
independently or autonomously, who can make more meaningful
decisions on consequential legal issues, and who gain more recognition
(internally and externally) for their craft are happiest in the judicial role.
On the other hand, we can also readily identify some structural
challenges to judicial job satisfaction. Judges generally have little
control over what work they do. Most Article III judges do not decide
which cases they take, and no judge has control over what cases enter
the federal system. There is, therefore, a substantial possibility that
judicial work becomes rote and routine—and not particularly varied or
meaningful to the judge (based on her ideology, personal interest, etc.).
Further, although Article III judges act with tremendous autonomy,
their individual decisions or opinions do not always carry the day.
Lower-court decisions are reviewed by higher courts, and higher-court
judges act only in groups of three (or more). Over time, it’s conceivable
that an appellate judge—especially one in an ideological minority on a
court—may grow increasingly frustrated by a lack of autonomy or
ability to contribute to decisions meaningful to him or her. One can
easily imagine the weariness of a perpetual dissenter.
As one ascends through the federal judicial hierarchy, the exercise
of judicial power—the ultimate exercise of autonomy—becomes both
more and less constrained in different ways. On the one hand, the
federal court of last resort—the Supreme Court of the United States—
has judicial supremacy over federal constitutional law;124 it has the

123 See RICHARD J. HACKMAN & GREG R. OLDHAM, WORK REDESIGN 88 (1980)
(Where “an individual is fully competent to carry out the work required by a complex,
challenging task, and has strong needs for personal growth and is well satisfied with
the work context, then we would expect both high personal satisfaction and high
work motivation and performance.”).
124 See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court,
115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 92 (2001) (discussing history of concept of “judicial
supremacy,” that is, “the idea that the Supreme Court has the last word when it
comes to constitutional interpretation (subject only to formal amendment)”).
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power to bind everyone,125 but (with some notable exceptions)126 the
justices on that Court cannot act alone. They may act only with the
agreement of at least four colleagues—a requirement that, depending
on the makeup of the Court,127 may be more constraining or less.128
Moreover, the justices have nearly unbridled power (again, with the
agreement of colleagues) to engage in their own agenda-setting, as their
docket is almost entirely discretionary unlike any other Article III or
Article I court.129
The middle child of the federal judiciary—the U.S. Courts of
Appeals—wields nearly as much power as the U.S. Supreme Court
with similar (but arguably more robust) constraints. Although the U.S.
Courts of Appeals are the courts of last resort for many appellants
(because of how few cases the Supreme Court hears),130 their
supremacy is, for the most part, circumscribed geographically,131 and
their judgments are (at least in theory) subject to further review by the
en banc court or by the Supreme Court or both.132 Although judges on
125 See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 347 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (“[I]t is the proper function
of the judicial department to interpret laws, and by the very terms of the constitution
to interpret the supreme law. Its interpretation, then, becomes obligatory and
conclusive upon all the departments of the federal government, and upon the whole
people, so far as their rights and duties are derived from, or affected by that
constitution.”); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (describing modern
understanding of judicial supremacy).
126 Individual justices have the power to act alone on matters that come before
them as applications to the circuit justice. See Sup. Ct. R. 22. Although many such
applications are routine matters, including requests for extensions of time, Sup. Ct.
R. 13.5, an individual justice also has the power to stay a lower court ruling, Sup Ct.
R. 23.
127 Justice Brennan famously quipped: “[W]ith five votes you can do anything
around here!” H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE
MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 16 (2008).
128 See Kevin M. Quinn, The Academic Study of Decision Making on Multimember
Courts, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1493, 1501 (2012) (“The nature of the decisions that a judge
on a multimember court faces is considerably different than that faced by a judge
sitting alone. Not only are the types of cases quite different but the very nature of
working closely with other judges creates both opportunities for, and constraints on,
additional action.”).
129 See Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.) (eliminating remaining vestiges of the U.S. Supreme Court’s mandatory
appellate docket).
130 See, e.g., Emily Hughes, Investigating Gideon’s Legacy in the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
122 YALE L.J. 2376, 2379 (2013) (describing U.S. Courts of Appeals as “the de facto
courts of last resort for litigants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel”).
131 28 U.S.C. § 41; 28 U.S.C. § 1291; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c), (d); 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
132 These are relatively weak constraints, of course. Even though the Supreme
Court has a particularly high reversal rate (for an appellate court), it only reverses a
tiny number—less than 1%—of the cases on its docket. Barry C. Edwards, Why
Appeals Courts Rarely Reverse Lower Courts: An Experimental Study to Explore Affirmation
Bias, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1035, 1039 (2019). En banc review is equally rare. See
Ryan W. Copus, Statistical Precedent: Allocating Judicial Attention, 73 VAND. L. REV. 605,
608 (2020) (noting that courts review only 0.19% of appeals en banc). For more on
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these courts generally sit in panels of three (and thus only need to
convince a single colleague to join a result),133 those panels change
frequently—a different kind of constraint than where panel
membership is both stable and of long standing.134
Although it is the “lowest” rung on the Article III ladder, federal
district court judges have more autonomy than do judges at any other
level within the federal judiciary.135 District court judges act alone—
they do not sit in panels, except on rare occasions136—and some of
their decisions are either protected by substantial deference or are
functionally unreviewable by higher courts (especially where they can
frame matters as issues of fact, not law).137 But nearly all of their final
judgments are subject to appeal as of right to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.138 That said, over the last half-century these trial-level judges
have increasingly become active case managers, as Judith Resnik first
described, wielding “greater power” and actively shaping case
outcomes “beyond the public view . . . and out of reach of appellate
review.”139 In at least some circumstances, the Article III district judge
exercises nearly autonomous judicial power over the matters before
her.
We largely lack data on federal judicial job satisfaction, but
anecdotal evidence on judicial retirement and resignation suggests that
federal judges, overall, are an extremely satisfied lot.140 The vast
majority who “retire” elect to become senior judges, where they are,
essentially, working for free (though there are financial incentives both
to “retire” and to continue working in at least a marginally part-time
capacity).141 During Stephen B. Burbank, S. Jay Plager, and Greg
modern en banc practices across the federal appellate courts, see Neal Devins &
Allison Orr Larsen, Weaponizing En Banc, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373 (2021).
133 28 U.S.C. § 46.
134 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember
Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on
Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1657–58 (2003) (“Judges are
constrained by, and responsive to, the behavior of other judges.”); Harry T. Edwards,
Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998).
135 See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 846 (1984) (“Single judges
have an independence not permitted other members of complex, hierarchical
institutions.”) [hereinafter Resnik, Tiers].
136 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
137 See, e.g., Resnik, Tiers, supra note 135, at 861(recognizing that “[e]ven in cases
where appeal is available, many of the decisions of the first tier [which includes the
federal district court] are given great deference”).
138 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
139 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 377-78 (1982)
[hereinafter Resnik, Managerial].
140 See Burbank, et al., supra note 55, at 84 tbl.28 (discussing survey results of
federal judges eligible for retirement or senior status who have elected to remain
active judges because, foremost, they “like the judicial work of a judge” and “like the
working conditions of a judge).
141 As of May 7, 2022, among the 62 Article III judicial vacancies created by
retirements or resignations (as opposed to elevations or death), only six of those 62
vacancies were created by an outright retirement and only one was created by a
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Ablavsky’s comprehensive forty-year study of federal judicial
retirements and resignations, 2,143 judges served on the lower federal
courts; 1,006 of those judges served in senior status during some
portion of that time.142 On the other hand, only 101 of those judges
retired (or 4.7% of those judges eligible to do so),143 and an even
smaller number—80 judges—resigned without receiving their
pensions.144
Although the numbers of retirements and resignations were small
(compared to the number of senior status judges), the apparent reasons
for retirements and resignations are telling. Both those judges who
retired shortly after becoming pension eligible and those who resigned
from office without receiving a pension did so for reasons that would
be familiar to most workers: they were generally either dissatisfied with
their pay or they sought new challenges. Overall, retirements were
driven foremost by a desire for more income, and, secondarily, by a
desire to seek new challenges.145 Although a smaller category of
retirements appeared to be for health reasons, approximately 69% of
retirements were for financial reasons or to obtain both financial
rewards and a more diverse and challenging experience outside of
judicial service.146 Likewise, judges who resigned largely complained
about “low” pay as well.147 Of the 80 federal judicial resignations during
the study, 36 judges resigned either to return to private practice or
because of inadequate salary.148 Eleven cited “dissatisfaction with the
office,” and 18 received appointments to another office (also reflecting
some measure of judicial dissatisfaction, given the choice to leave a
life-tenured-position before their pension vested).149 Of those who
specifically expressed dissatisfaction with the judicial office, those
judges complained about the workload, constraints on judging

resignation. Admin. Office of U.S. Courts, Current Judicial Vacancies,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/current-judicialvacancies (last visited May 7, 2022). Thus, nearly 90% of the current judicial vacancies
created by retirement or resignation involve judges electing to go senior rather than
to retire outright.
142 Burbank, et al., supra note 55, at 21.
143 Id. at 56.
144 Id. at 12-13.
145 Id. at 71, tbl.21. Notably, this factor was far more significant to district court
judges than it was to circuit court judges, who predominately were driven to retire to
find “new challenges.” Id.
146 Id. at 63.
147 Id. at 12-13 (noting “overlap” between decision to return to private practice
and being motivated by inadequate salary); see also id. at 15 (noting that most
resignations during study period were related to “inadequate salary” and identifying
at least 42 of 80 judges who resigned for that reason).
148 Id. at 13 fig.1.
149 Id. Even for some resignations for other offices, salary may have played a
role; three federal judges departed for the California state bench, where they received
more pay. Id. at 13 n.69.
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imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines, dissatisfaction with the
monastic lifestyle, and a desire to seek “new challenges.”150
But retirements and resignations were the exceptions and far more
judges remained active in “senior status” instead. And they did so,
predominately, because of the love of the work: the number one reason
why judges remained in senior status (instead of seeking full
retirement) was that they “like[d] the judicial work of a judge.”151 The
same was true for judges who elected to stay active judges well past the
age when they could qualify for retirement or senior status.152 All told,
it’s nice work if you can get it. And, as the next Part considers, judges
have used macro-judging to make the job even better—especially in
the face of caseload demands that threatened to dilute the prestige of
the position and overwhelm the courts with humdrum matters.
II. HOW MACRO-JUDGING HAS CONSTRUCTED
AND ENTRENCHED ARTICLE III EXCEPTIONALISM
As good as Article III judicial work is, throughout the last halfcentury or so, Article III judges have faced down at least two major
demons: rising caseloads and intensifying case complexity. Each placed
a heavy burden on the courts and, as a result, threatened—at least in
the view of some—to “less[en] the prestige and attractiveness of the
office.”153 These problems were largely orthogonal. In the words of
one federal judge, a lot of “small cases” and an “ever-increasing
caseload with an ever-larger percentage . . . of relatively routine work
which neither requires nor engages the abilities of a first-rate judge”
were strangling Article III courts.154 That left these “first-rate” judges,
in words of another lifetime Article III appointee, with little time for
the “big case[s]”—which were the “major commercial litigation[s]” or
federal actions under “laws regulating interstate commerce.”155 At the
same time, those “big cases” were increasing in complexity while our
150 Id. at 15 (collecting publicly stated reasons for dissatisfaction with federal
judicial office as reason for resignation).
151 Id. at 53 tbl.9.
152 Id. at 84 tbl.28.
153 See Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50 OHIO
ST. L.J. 399, 399 (1989) (“In both state and federal courts caseloads have increased
exponentially in quantity and complexity. These trends have inexorably led not only
to vastly heavier demands on each judge but also to increased numbers of judges at
every level, a development viewed by some as ‘cheapening the currency,’ or lessening
the prestige and attractiveness of the office. Exacerbating these stresses are the
dramatically increasing gap between the compensation of the rest of the legal
profession and that of judges . . . .”).
154 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 214 (quoting William
H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the American Bar Association (Aug.
9, 1976), in Carolyn Dineen King, A Batter of Conscience, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 955, 961
(1991); internal quotation marks omitted).
155 Id. (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American
Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 15, 1987); internal
quotation marks omitted).
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economy and the body of federal regulatory law grew. By the 1950s,
Article III judges expressed grave concerns about the growth of
complex litigation—especially complex antitrust matters—describing
that caseload as an “acute problem in the administration of justice.”156
So, the big cases were getting bigger, while the small cases were getting
smaller and more numerous, and the Article III judiciary didn’t have
the resources to handle them both.
The answer to each problem was basically the same albeit with
wildly different effects—increased “case management.”157 As Judith
Resnik’s groundbreaking work first described, federal judges became
active “managers” of their dockets, giving them “greater power”
outside “circumscribed judicial authority.”158 District judges began
working “beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to
provide written, reasoned opinions, and out of reach of appellate
review.”159 Pretrial discovery and judicial workload both pressed
district court judges into new, more active roles, where they engaged
early and often with the parties to drive towards a speedy resolution of
the litigation.160 This active, managerial stance carried over to the
federal appellate courts, too, where judges began delegating work to
others and developing triage regimes for sorting wheat from chaff (that
is, important cases from the less so).161 As a result, Article III judges
became more hands-on (and exerted more power) over the “big”
complex cases, while using those new-fangled managerial powers to
direct others to handle the “small” matters no longer deemed worthy
of an Article III judge’s attention.
The modern story of “case management” is ultimately a story of
Article III exceptionalism—a perpetuation and preservation of an elite
or “special”162 federal judiciary that should be devoted to the “big”
cases, while delegating away smaller nuisances. Article III judges at
every level of the federal judiciary have used macro-judging to entrench
Article III exceptionalism—that is, to maintain a small, prestigious,
and powerful federal judiciary focused on the “big” cases worthy of a
“first-rate” Article III judiciary. These reforms may have benefitted the
system in at least some respects, but they may also reflect a procedural
judicial power grab.
156 Judicial Conference of the U.S., Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13
F.R.D. 41, 64 (1951).
157 Resnik, Managerial, supra note 139, at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 See id. at 379-80 (discussing reasons for managerial turn).
161 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 115 (explaining how
“[j]udges on the federal courts of appeals now run something that resembles an office
in a large law firm”).
162 Id. at 214 (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON
COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING 5 (Feb. 16, 1993); internal
quotation marks omitted).
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This Part will move from the bottom up within Article III—from
the district courts to the Supreme Court—to describe how macrojudging within Article III has entrenched a culture of Article III
specialness and elitism. Although I organize this discussion by court,
these examples of macro-judging share more in common than this
structure might otherwise suggest. Ultimately, I bring these themes
together by focusing on the Article III judiciary’s collective opposition
to meaningful Article III expansion—an objection that is rooted in and
ultimately perpetuates Article III exceptionalism.
A.

The District Court

Two significant macro-judging features at the district-court level
have entrenched Article III exceptionalism: the reliance on and
increased use of judicial adjuncts (magistrate judges and bankruptcy
judges), and the so-called “MDL revolution.”163 Both developments
are quintessential examples of macro-judging; these are structural
developments that judges initiated, propelled, or have strengthened
over time. They may have been born from necessity and even
addressed systemic need in some desirable ways. But they also have
given Article III judges more autonomy (including more control over
the kind of work they do and how they do it), reduced low-value or
drudge work, and increased judicial prestige. They have, in short, made
the job of judging better for the Article III judge—especially in the
wake of greater demands on judicial time and attention.
1. The Rise of Adjuncts
District court judges have outsourced their least desirable work to
Article I adjuncts.164 By developing a corps of Article I decisionmakers
to work alongside Article III courts, the Article III district court judges
have maintained and consolidated their power by keeping their ranks
small and focused on “big” cases.165 Although Article I judges are
“indispensable” to the federal system,166 there’s a darker side to the rise
of Article I labor within Article III courts. The rise of adjuncts is
intimately intertwined with efforts to maintain and entrench a small,167
Gluck & Burch, supra note 13, at 1 (capitalization omitted).
See supra notes 66-89 and accompanying text (discussing history of federal
magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, and their current use).
165 To be sure, this narrative is perhaps most convincing when assessing the
district courts’ civil docket. District court judges surely might say they face heavy
criminal caseloads that they are unable to share or offload on Article I adjuncts and
that involve lower-profile or even low-value work. That district court judges spend
so much of their time interacting with vulnerable communities through the criminal
process (and not in defense of civil rights), is its own, separate problem—one that is
bound to have spill-over effects in terms of how much attention those courts give to
civil claims from marginalized communities.
166 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991).
167 Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at 992.
163
164
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elite, and exceptional federal judiciary. Adding adjuncts allowed the
Article III judiciary to more than double168 its resources without
diluting an ounce of Article III prestige.
In her work cataloguing a century’s worth of what I might now
describe as “macro-judging” by the federal judiciary, Judith Resnik
observed that the development of the magistrate judge, in particular,
reflected a collective view that the Article III judiciary was “important
and should be reserved for special assignments,” and that, to avoid
expanding the ranks of constitutional judges to meet demand,
“adjudication by non-life-tenured judges” could handle less important
work.169 Resnik elsewhere explained that the rise of Article I judges,
and the delegation of low-value “housekeeping” work to them,
reflected core judgments about what is and is not work “worthy” of an
Article III judge: “The sense . . . is that those cases [including “‘routine’
tort cases” or “cases challenging government decisions under certain
federal regulatory schemes”] are somehow beneath the dignity of the
Article III judiciary.”170 It is no surprise, then, that Article III judges
themselves have been instrumental in developing and shaping the role
of the magistrate and bankruptcy judges.
Let’s begin with the story of the federal magistrate judge. At every
turn, the Judicial Conference of the United States—the policy-making
body of the federal judiciary that is, as Resnik has described it, the
“voice” of the Article III judiciary before Congress171—influenced the
development of the modern magistrate judge.172 Most significantly,
perhaps, was Judicial Conference support for the expansion of the
magistrate judges’ duties with respect to pretrial civil litigation.173 The
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which ultimately expanded
magistrate judicial authority, originally required a “judge and not a
magistrate” to preside over the “mandatory discovery-case
management conference.”174 Citing concerns raised by the Judicial
Conference, and other witnesses, then-Senator Biden (who was serving
as the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee) introduced a revised
See supra notes 83-89 (discussing numbers of Article I adjuncts and volume
of their workload).
169 Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at 992.
170 Resnik, Housekeeping, supra note 139, at 940.
171 See Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at 929 (discussing role of Judicial Conference).
172 See McCabe, supra note 72, at 344-50 (discussing involvement of Judicial
Conference); see also Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, “Nothing Less Than
Indispensable”: The Expansion of Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past
Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L. J. 845, 849-50 (2016) (discussing importance of the
Federal Courts Study Committee—an entity within the Judicial Conference—in
recommending expansion of duties and clarification of constitutional authority for
federal magistrates).
173 See Lee & Davis, supra note 172, at 852 (discussing Judicial Conference
support for “pretrial role for magistrate judges”).
174 MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A GUIDE
TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 88
(2009) [hereinafter “LEGISLATIVE HISTORY”].
168
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bill that authorized magistrate judges to take part in pretrial
proceedings.175 Although the Committee’s report gave several reasons
for the change—including litigants’ desire to avoid prejudicing a judge
who might ultimately rule on the case—among those reasons offered
was a desire to “provide district judges with more time to conduct
other adjudicatory matters.”176 That view was not new: the Federal
Magistrates Act of 1968 promised “to cull from the ever-growing
workload of the U.S. district courts matters that are more desirably
performed by a lower tier of judicial officers.”177 The idea, then, in
creating magistrate judges and expanding their authority was, as Resnik
observed, that “some work is to be avoided if possible” and “some
cases are of ‘lesser order’ than others.”178 If Article III judges could
give that disfavored work to others, while keeping their focus on more
“important” matters, all the better.
The story of the bankruptcy judge is similar in important ways.
Despite the Constitution providing for Congress to create a uniform
law of bankruptcy,179 bankruptcy has, in the words of one bankruptcy
judge, “always been the step-child of the federal judiciary.”180
Originally, Article III district judges appointed “referees-inbankruptcy, who were paid a portion of the assets that passed through
their administration” to handle “the mundane business affairs of the
cases.”181 The “referees” had no library, no law clerks, and no robes;
they did not handle the more sophisticated bankruptcy issues that
went, instead, to Article III judges.182 But that more limited role
expanded over time, and by the 1950s and 1960s, referees had become
fulltime employees of the federal judiciary and “the Article III judiciary
175 See Lee & Davis, supra note 172, at 853 (discussing revisions to the Civil
Justice Reform Act and Judicial Conference opposition to early draft) (citing 136
Cong. Rec. S6473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990)).
176 Id. at 853 (citing LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 169, at 89). As one Article
III judge succinctly observed: “All judges (and their law clerks) hate discovery
disputes.” Hon. James G. Carr, Fixing Discovery: The Judge’s Job, 100 JUDICATURE 10,
11 (no. 3, 2016).
177 S. Rep. No. 90-371, at 9 (1967).
178 Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at 963. Resnik, of course, is not alone in expressing
concern about the two-tier system of justice this scheme might create. See also
McCabe, supra note 72, at 384 (acknowledging concerns that expansion of magistrate
judge authority creates a “dual system of justice” or raises “the specter of a federal
poor people’s court”); Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate
Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 477
(2002) (recognized that system with special magistrate to handle pro se cases may be
viewed “as a way to funnel unimportant matters that society regards as annoying
away from Article III judges to magistrate judges without life tenure, and so raise
concerns about second class justice for unrepresented litigants”).
179 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
180 The Honorable Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the
Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part One: Outside Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1,
3 (2007). Judge Mund’s article provides a comprehensive account of the history of
the bankruptcy judge—much of which is beyond the scope of this work.
181 Id. at 3.
182 Id.
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acknowledged this upgraded position by providing the referees with
the trappings of judicial office”—things like robes, courtrooms, and
court reporters (at least for some).183
Even still, Article III judges resisted efforts to give Article III status
to their bankruptcy colleagues—even though doing so might have
drastically simplified existing law. In 1982, the Supreme Court held that
Congress had violated Article III in enacting comprehensive
bankruptcy reforms in 1978 that gave bankruptcy judges too much
“judicial power” without the protections of Article III.184 The most
expedient (and perhaps obvious) solution would have been to extend
Article III protections to bankruptcy judges. The infrastructure to do
so was already in place, and it would have avoided a messy
constitutional thicket that persists to this day.185 But there had been
long-standing hostility among the Article III judiciary to that kind of
solution, as Chief Justice Warren Burger, who by virtue of his position
also led the Judicial Conference, had steadfastly lobbied Congress
against giving bankruptcy judges Article III status.186 According to
many, Chief Justice Burger feared giving former bankruptcy lawyers,
who he thought of as “low-caliber legal professionals,” the prestige of
an Article III appointment;187 he decried “grade creep,” as he told
President Jimmy Carter in an extraordinary letter urging the President
to veto the 1978 law creating the modern bankruptcy courts.188 Indeed,
the battle between the bankruptcy judges and Article III judges had
become so “embittered” that in at least one district court, bankruptcy
referees (as they were known at that time) were not permitted “to use
the title ‘judge’, wear robes, or ride the judges’ elevator in the
courthouse.”189
Ultimately, when it came time to fix the constitutional problems
with the 1978 bankruptcy act, Congress blinked, and acceded to the
wishes of the Article III bench by maintaining a “clear demarcation
between Article III judges and bankruptcy judges.”190 Article III judges
maintained the “status . . . they [were] guarding so carefully,” according

Id. at 3-4 (discussing upgrades in connection with 1938 legislative expansion
of the referee’s role).
184 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57-87
(1982) (holding that broad grant of authority to bankruptcy judges violates Article
III and that the “judicial Power of the United States” must be exercised by judges
with life tenure and salary protection).
185 See supra note 64-71 and accompanying text (discussing effects of Stern v.
Marshall).
186 See The Honorable Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and
the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part Five: Inside the White House, 82 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 175, 182 (2008) (describing Chief Justice Burger’s extraordinary opposition in
great depth).
187 Coco, supra note 68, at 195.
188 Mund, supra note 186, at 183 (quoting letter to President Carter).
189 Coco, supra note 68, at 195.
190 Id. at 200.
183
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to one key congressional representative,191 while ushering in decades
of confusion for bankruptcy and Article III courts alike over the
jurisdictional and constitutional authority of these Article I judges. But
at least the Article III bench remained small, elite, and unsullied by
pedestrian bankruptcy work.192 Having resisted efforts to dilute the
Article III bench, the Article III courts succeeded in not just
maintaining their small, elite size but also in entrenching their
specialness by differentiating themselves from and delegating
disfavored work to Article I adjuncts.
2. The Rise of the MDL
Delegation to Article I adjuncts has enabled Article III courts to
focus their attention on the “big” cases on their dockets—on the civil
side, at least. And when it comes to “big” cases, there’s perhaps
nothing bigger than the MDL or “multidistrict litigation.”193 That
profoundly important federal procedural device has transformed
Article III judicial power at the district court level. The statute seems
benign and beneficial: it authorizes a judicial panel on multidistrict
litigation to transfer and consolidate for coordinated pretrial

191 130 Cong. Rec. H1847 (daily ed. March 21, 1984) (statement of
Representative Don Edwards).
192 Lest one think I’m being particularly harsh on Article III judges, it turns out
at least some bankruptcy judges themselves are guilty of the same-kind of prestigeseeking. A small handful of bankruptcy judges have been competing for the highestprofile and largest bankruptcy cases by taking advantage of flexible bankruptcy venue
rules. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11’s Descent into Lawlessness, 96 AMER.
BANKRUPTCY L.J. ___, ___ (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4) (describing “four
decades of competition among the bankruptcy courts for big cases”). According to
Lynn LoPucki, “[a] liberal venue law adopted in the 1970s,” which has been pushed
to the max, has “led to competition among some bankruptcy courts to attract the big
cases.” Id. at 4. The competition advantages the judges themselves and the
jurisdictions in which they sit: “Those [big] cases offered prestige to the judges who
attracted them, a billion-dollar-a-year restructuring industry to the jurisdiction that
attracted them, and prosperity to the bankruptcy lawyers in those jurisdictions.” Id.;
see also id. at 19-24 (discussing advantages to bankruptcy judges and others for
successful competition). Although only a handful of bankruptcy judges currently
compete for these “big cases,” those judges dominate the high-end bankruptcy
market; together, the five bankruptcy courts in the competition “attract more than
ninety percent of the big cases nationally.” Id. at 4. They compete, moreover, on the
promise that they will “routinely bend and break [bankruptcy] law” in favor of those
who place cases in the relevant jurisdictions. Id.
Moreover, bankruptcy judges aren’t the only judges who compete for big cases.
District judges also actively court litigants to file patent cases in their judicial
divisions—a phenomenon especially prevalent in some districts in Texas. See J. Jonas
Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 635 (2015).
193 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Although a handful of MDLs are gargantuan proceedings
involving “our must public controversies” like litigation over opioids and NFL
concussions, Zachary Clopton has shown that “MDLs vary widely” in their structure
and use. Zachary D. Clopton, MDL as Category, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1297, 129897 (2020).
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proceedings any federal cases with similar facts.194 Today, “a whopping
twenty-one percent of all newly filed federal civil cases and, by some
estimates, nearly forty percent of the pending civil caseload” are MDL
proceedings.195
Selection as a transferee judge for an MDL confers “elite status”
on a federal district court judge.196 And scholars have long recognized
the tremendous—and largely un-checked197—power that MDLs
confer on transferee judges.198 Indeed, Brian Fitzpatrick has described
MDLs as “concentrat[ing] more power in the hands of a single person
than perhaps any other part of our judicial system.”199 Under the MDL,
he says, “one judge” can end up handling “tens of thousands or even
hundreds of thousands of cases” in one fell swoop, whereas, ordinarily,
such decisionmaking power would be spread throughout the Article
III bench.200 And because nearly all of the pretrial decisions the MDL
judge makes are practically unreviewable, Fitzpatrick points out that
“the decisions of the single MDL judge are usually the only decisions
any federal judge at any level will render in MDL cases.”201
A small group of (mostly) federal judges202 drafted and successfully
lobbied for this 1968 “sleeper”203 statute with a mind to do just that:
that is, to “reshape federal litigation” by conferring tremendous power
on the transferee judge.204 “The guiding light,” as Andrew D. Bradt has
explained, “of the [drafting and lobbying] judges’ efforts was their
perception that power of litigation must be centralized in the hands of

28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
Gluck & Burch, supra note 13, at 3.
196 Gluck & Burch, supra note 13, at 19; see also Zachary D. Clopton & Andrew
D. Bradt, Party Preferences in Multidistrict Litigation, 107 CAL. L. REV. 1713, 1722 (2019)
(“[T]he selection of the transferee judge is among the most momentous decisions
made in the entire litigation”).
197 Little of what happens in MDLs is or can be appealed. See Gluck & Burch,
supra note 13, at 20 (explaining why “few MDL issues ever reach the appellate
courts”).
198 See, e.g., Clopton & Bradt, supra note 196, at 1725 (“Transferee judges wield
enormous authority . . . .”); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action,
80 U. CINN. L. REV. 389, 424 (2012) (“The MDL statute and MDL procedure was
never intended to confer such broad power and authority on a federal court . . . .”).
199 Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Many Minds, Many MDL Judges, 84 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 107, 107 (2021) (“A single judge can end up resolving hundred, thousands, or
even hundreds of thousands of individually viable cases.”).
200 Id. at 108.
201 Id. at 109.
202 Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 831, 838-39 (2017) (identifying handful of judges who worked
with Dean Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago School of Law to draft MDL
statute). Ultimately, that small group of judges secured the support of the Judicial
Congress—the policy-making organ of the federal courts—thereby ensuring their
proposal would be submitted to Congress. Id. at 883.
203 Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
Summer 1991, at 5, 47 (identifying MDL as a “sleeper”).
204 Bradt, supra note 202, at 839.
194
195
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a single judge with national authority and maximum flexibility.”205 The
judges who crafted the MDL statute designed it to confer something
like “authoritarian . . . power,”206 or, we might say, to give maximum
autonomy to the transferee judge. That power or autonomy is the
fulcrum of existing scholarly criticism of the MDL itself: as Bradt
succinctly explained, “what makes MDL such an effective means of
resolving mass litigation is also what provokes intense criticism: the
almost unlimited discretion of the district judge that the Panel puts in
charge of the litigation.”207 Ultimately, we may see the MDL device as
an “intentional power grab” by a handful of district court judges who
believed in “judicial control of cases.”208
The “MDL Revolution,” as Abbe Gluck and Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch recently described it, is another chapter in a larger story of
Resnik’s “managerial judging.”209 Even as the “managerial” stance of
federal judges has increased their power, it has also increased their
workload. Gone are the days where judges passively waited for parties
to file motions or proceed to trial.210 Enter, then, the need for more
magistrate judicial labor across all civil cases and especially in MDL
proceedings, where transferee judges have turned not only to
magistrate judges but to various private actors for help.211 Even in the
most complex and high-profile district court litigation, judges
outsource or delegate much of their work to others, which, in the
context of MDL proceedings, raises a host of issues about oversight
and accountability (among others) that Elizabeth Chamblee Burch and
Margaret S. Williams have recently explored.212
All this to say: district court judges over the last fifty years have
acted collectively to consolidate their authority, delegate their least
sophisticated or valued work to others, and attract higher-profile, more
elite civil work for themselves. To the extent Article III judges
continue to toil with “low value” or “unimportant” work, that work
arises mostly on the criminal side of the docket, where Article III
judges have less statutory authority to delegate. But that arrangement,
Id. at 840.
Id. at 841.
207 Id. at 847.
208 Id. at 907. Bradt is careful to say that his description is not meant “to cast
aspersions on the judges’ good intentions,” but it is to say that the judge’s aims “were
to profoundly change the way the courts process what they believed would be the
lion’s share of federal civil cases.” Id. at 907-08. My point is only that the shift also
aligned with judicial self-interest to exert greater control over many of the most
“important” issues that would be filed in federal courts.
209 Resnik, Managerial, supra note 139, at 378.
210 See id. at 384 (describing district court judges traditional, passive role in
litigation).
211 See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Judicial
Adjuncts in Multidistrict Litigation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2129 (2020) (examining use of
various judicial adjuncts in MDL litigation).
212 See id. at 2214-24 (discussing implications of privatized judicial assistance in
MDLs).
205
206
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too, is revealing. Marginalized litigants may have meaningful access to
Article III courts only when they are on the blunt-force end of punitive
governmental authority. Their access is far more circumscribed—and
their matters deemed far less important—when petitioning courts for
redress of civil wrongs. The “ordinary” civil claim receives far less
Article III attention than the “ordinary” criminal one—a telling fact
about how Article III power operates vis-à-vis the ordinary individual
civil litigant.
B.

The U.S. Courts of Appeals

The same trends that drove innovation in the federal district courts
have shaped the U.S. Courts of Appeals in equally profound ways. On
the one hand, the patina of Article III only enhances at each step in
the Article III hierarchy. On the other, federal appellate judges have
far less individual control over the work they do and how they do it;
collaborative decisionmaking dilutes their power. Moreover, the “big”
civil cases in MDLs do not make their way into the appellate courts,
having been steered to settlement in lower courts. Most of the federal
appellate judge’s work—indeed, sometimes as much as 90% of it—is
seen by these Article III judges as so routine, boring, or low-value that
it doesn’t even warrant much, if any, judicial attention.213 And so the
federal appellate courts have used macro-judging to mostly avoid that
work that might otherwise make their work far less interesting, varied,
and sophisticated.
If the MDL revolution is the most significant macro-judging
development over the last half-century in the district courts, the
development of a selective federal appellate triage regime214 is the most
significant macro-judging reform at the federal appellate courts. Both
reforms, fundamentally, have given courts more control over the kind
of work they do and how they do it, while privileging the extraordinary
over the ordinary and relying on non-Article III decisionmakers for
help. Federal appellate judges, on average, have a greater concentration
of “low value” pro se litigation than we see in the district courts; in
some circuits, nearly 60% of docketed cases are from unrepresented
appellants.215 Just like district court judges turned to magistrate judges
to reduce their “low value” work, federal appellate judges have made a
See McAlister, supra note 11, at 1179-80 tbl.5 (discussing oral-argument and
publication rates across the circuits to demonstrate size of second-tier process for
less favored appeals).
214 The most comprehensive discussion of the intersecting features of these
macro-judging choices appears in William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds’s
career capstone, Injustice on Appeal. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11.
215 See McAlister, supra note 11, at 1185 tbl.7 (observing that across all circuits
five-year means for pro se appellant filings was 49.1% in the year ending in 2020; in
three circuits the means were at or near 60%). In district courts, the percentage of
pro se litigation by volume is closer to 20%, but sometimes as much as 30%
depending on the district. Andrew Hammond, The Federal Rules of Pro Se Procedure, 90
FORD. L. REV. 2689, 2691 (2022).
213
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similar move.216 Beset with worries over rising caseloads,217 federal
appellate judges transformed their historical model for adjudication—
one where judges read briefs, heard argument, and wrote
decisions218—into a two-tiered bureaucratic machine.219 In the first tier,
judges continue to hear oral argument, oversee cases, and write
precedential decisions; in the second tier, central staff primarily
evaluate cases on briefs without argument and draft non-precedential
opinions that judges rubber-stamp.220 In some circuits, the volume of
second-tier work is enormous, accounting for upwards of 80% to 90%
of appeals, as oral argument rates and publication rates have
plummeted over time.221
The federal appellate courts engaged in these reforms almost
entirely on their own222—albeit with the help of Congress to authorize

But the move was not quite the same; it’s worth noting that there has been
some judicial opposition to creating “federal appellate magistrates” who would
operate like federal magistrate judges in the district courts. See Richard S. Arnold, The
Future of the Federal Courts, 60 MO. L. REV. 533, 542 (1995) (explaining that the idea
of an “appellate magistrate . . . makes my blood run cold” and noting that “[i]f I’ve
got an appeal, I want a judge to decide it”); see also Stephen Reinhardt, Surveys without
Solutions: Another Study of the Courts of Appeals, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1505, 1512 (1995)
(similar). But there are transparency and quality reasons to think such a system might
be preferrable to the current one. See, e.g., David R. Cleveland, Post-Crisis
Reconsideration of Federal Court Reform, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 47, 89 (2013) (discussing
benefits of federal appellate magistrates). Unlike federal magistrate judges, who are
formal (albeit inferior) judicial officers, who make public decisions, and who are
appointed through an open, transparent and rigorous process, the central staff
attorneys who assist federal appellate courts toil behind the scenes, may be recent
law school graduates without significant experience, and are selected by court staff
(and not judges). See generally McAlister, supra note 11, at 1158-59 (discussing some of
the structural concerns with staff attorneys).
217 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 634, 642 (1974).
218 Richman & Reynolds, Elitism, supra note 4, at 278 (describing traditional
appellate process as the “Learned Hand Tradition”).
219 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 115 (“Judges on the
federal courts of appeals now run something that resembles an office in a large law
firm.”).
220 See McAlister, supra note 11, at 1159-61 (discussing tiers of federal appellate
process and review).
221 See id., at 1180 tbl.5 (current publication and oral argument rates based on
five-year means); id. at 1178-80 (discussing trends in oral argument and publication);
id. at 1153 (discussing reduction in oral argument).
222 The changes discussed here were “unilateral”—that is, they were entirely
court-initiated and driven. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 115.
Early experiments in a few circuits quickly expanded to all circuits. See, e.g., Charles
R. Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973
WASH. U. L.Q. 257, 264 (discussing one circuit’s early experiments with “screening
and summary procedures and warning that “dramatic innovations . . . may be the
standard procedure for all appeals . . . within the next five years”). Scholars have
described these reforms as “judicial activism of the highest order.” REYNOLDS &
RICHMAN, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at xii, 115.
216
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and fund new staff positions.223 These intersecting macro-judging
decisions—reducing oral argument, increasing non-publication, and
hiring and relying on central judicial staff—have given federal appellate
judges far more control over the kinds of cases they hear and how
much decisional effort they put into resolving them. Judges can focus
on what interests them most; they let their central staff—none of
whom they directly oversee224—handle the rest of the boring,
uninteresting work. As one scholar has explained: “Structurally, staff
attorneys do the work that judges don’t want to do so that judicial time
may be spent on other, more ‘important’ matters (that judges work on
with elbow clerks). Their job, fundamentally, is to take work off a
judge’s plate . . . .”225
Just as with the macro-judging reforms in the district court, the
development of the federal appellate triage system may have been both
entirely necessary and even (at least partially) beneficial.226 But those
reforms also took off like a runaway train, propelled by convenience
as much as need.227 Appeals have dropped over the last decade, while
rates of non-publication remain high.228 Recent empirical work
confirms that this system produces unequal results, as “low-value”
appeals from unrepresented litigants and prisoners are far less likely to
receive oral argument and precedential treatment, and far more likely

223 See McAlister, supra note 11, at 1154-58 (discussing development of law clerk
and central staff attorneys and history of congressional authorization).
224 See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE
COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 108 (“Central staff attorneys are lawyers employed
by an appellate court to work for the court as an entity. . . . [T]hey have no close
relationship to any particular judge. They are organized centrally under the
supervision of a lawyer who is the head of the staff and who in turn is answerable to
the court.”).
225 McAlister, supra note 11, at 1159-59.
226 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 168–69 (1996) (“Given the workload of the federal courts of appeals today,
the realistic choice is not between limited publication, on the one hand, and, on the
other, improving then publishing all the opinions that are not published today; it is .
. . between giving the parties reasons for the decision of their appeal and not giving
them reasons even though the appeal is not frivolous.”); Hon. Jon O. Newman, The
Second Circuit’s Expedited Adjudicate of Asylum Cases, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV. 429, 437
(2008) (explaining and defending Second Circuit’s use of non-argument calendar as
a “fair[], effective[], and efficient[]” respond to “an extraordinary challenge”); Hon.
Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178-79
(1999) (“Whereas academicians tend to see unpublished opinions as causing a variety
of systemic problems, judges tend to see them as a necessary, and not necessarily
evil, part of the job.”).
227 See McAlister, supra note 11, at 1169-75 (discussing judicial incentives to
maintain federal appellate triage system despite reduction in caseload volume).
228 See id. at 1170-71 (arguing that “caseload volume alone can no longer account
for the continued reliance on unpublished decisions” and observing that “in 1992,
when the U.S. Courts of Appeals heard around 48,000 (roughly the volume they hear
today), the courts were publishing approximately 29% of their work nationwide,”
whereas today they publish only 13%).
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to receive shorter written decisions (even compared to other, similar
“easy” or “low-value” appeals).229
At this point, those who benefit the most from these macrojudging reforms are likely the federal appellate judges themselves. They
can operate more like the choosy court of last resort that sits atop the
federal judicial hierarchy, exercising autonomy over which cases
receive their time and attention.230 They can—and seemingly do—
spend more time crafting longer, more attention- and headlinegrabbing decisions.231 At bottom, the federal appellate triage system
minimizes the risk that federal appellate judges become bored with the
humdrum appeals of (mostly) pro se litigants, while conserving their
time and attention for the work they deem most befitting their position
and authority—the most “important” or significant cases percolating
through the federal judicial system, which receive extraordinary judicial
attention compared to the average appeal.
C.

The Supreme Court of the United States

We can readily identify some of the same trends we’ve seen in the
lower federal courts at the Supreme Court. In particular, the Court
lobbied Congress for decades to expand its discretion over its merits
docket.232 The reason, by now, should be familiar: The Supreme Court
229 See Rachel Brown, Jade Ford, Sahrula Kubie, Katrin Marquez, Bennett
Ostdiek, & Abbe R. Gluck, Is Unpublished Unequal? An Empirical Examination of the
87% Nonpublication Rate in Federal Appeals, 107 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 37 (2022)
(concluding that “the federal judiciary is disproportionately and systematically not
publishing cases brought by certain types of litigants—namely litigants representing
themselves and incarcerated individuals”); see also Merritt E. McAlister, Bottom-Rung
Appeals, ___ L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2023) (manuscript at 3) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author) (demonstrating that “decisions in unrepresented
appeals are, on average, about half the length of decisions in counseled appeals when
controlling for publication status, outcome, and oral argument”).
230 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 118 (arguing that
federal appellate courts no longer are courts of mandatory jurisdiction and review
but operate more like certiorari courts).
231 See Gluck, et al., supra note 229, at 71 & fig. 17 (observing that an “increase in
the average length of published opinions seems almost entirely responsible for” a
“widening” gap between published and unpublished decisions over time, where the
average length of published decisions has swelled from 2000 words in 1990 to more
than 5000 words in 2017, while unpublished decisions have held steady at, on average
1000 words).
232 Most recently, the Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988 eliminated
virtually all the Supreme Court’s remaining mandatory jurisdiction. Pub. L. No. 100352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). That legislation
resulted from over a decade of correspondence from all nine justices to Congress,
complaining about the difficulties of its remaining mandatory review docket. See
Bennett Boskey & Eugene Gressman, The Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory
Appeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 91-94 (1988) (discussing letters from the Court to Congress
and collecting the Court’s public statements on the problems). But even before that,
Chief Justice Taft and a committee of Supreme Court justices “suggested to Congress
that [its docket crisis in the 1920s] be addressed by reducing the mandatory docket
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had too much work on its mandatory docket that was not sufficiently
significant or important.233 Congress eliminated the last remnants of
the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 1988, freeing the Court
to select for itself nearly every case it hears.234 It has exercised that
discretion with enthusiasm and by taking fewer and fewer cases over
time.235 Recent empirical work confirms that the elimination of the
Supreme Court’s remaining mandatory jurisdiction had a “persistent
and strong downward influence on the number of appeals the Court
decided each Term.”236 After the jurisdictional change, “the Court, on
average, decided 71.2 fewer appeals per Term,” leading researchers to
conclude that it was “difficult to overstate the importance” of the
change in the law.237 Whether the Supreme Court’s reduced merits
docket matters or not,238 the dramatic reduction in the Court’s
workload over time—coupled with technological efficiencies—have
given a Court that already operates with great autonomy even more
independence to structure its work as it chooses. Justices now have
more time to devote to their merits docket (including writing longer
decisions or more separate decisions)239 and to engage in other pursuits
(like seeking public recognition, getting book advances, and doing
high-profile speaking gigs in far-flung locales).
and expanding the discretionary docket,” which Congress did, “largely in the terms
suggested by the Court.” Id. at 85-86.
233 To this end, in a 1982 letter to Congress signed by all nine Justices, the Court
explained: “At present, the Court must devote a great deal of its limited time and
attention on cases which do not, in Chief Justice Taft’s words, ‘involve principles,
the application of which are of wide public importance or governmental interest, and
which should be authoritatively declared by the final court.’” Id. at 91 (quoting H.
Rep. No. 100-660 (May 26, 1988), at 27-28, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1988,
pp. 766, 781).
234 The development of the so-called “cert pool,” which has been described as
a “time-saving mechanism for the Justices’ chambers” to share in the labor of sorting
through petitions for writs of certiorari, is also a macro-judging feature that
undoubtedly conserves judicial (and law clerk) labor. Ryan J. Owens & David A.
Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219,
1235 (2012). Scholars have suggested that the development of the “cert pool” itself
also has led to a decline in the Supreme Court’s merits docket. See, e.g., David R. Stras,
The Supreme Court’s Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 151, 160 (2010) (observing that cert pool may contribute to reduction in
merits docket). But see Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Supreme
Court’s Plenary Docket, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 737, 791 (2001) (arguing that cert
pool did not have much systemic effect on volume of merits docket).
235 See Heise, et al., supra note 14, at 1579 fig.3 (establishing downward trend in
merits cases).
236 Id. at 1581.
237 Id.
238 There is some debate about whether this is normatively problematic or not.
Compare Owens & Simon, supra note 234, at 1251-60 (making the case for why
shrinking docket matters), with Heise, et al., supra note 14, at 1588-90 (identifying
some positive or at least “nonnegative” aspects of dwindling docket).
239 The Supreme Court “decide[s] half as many cases as it did a generation ago,
and [is] using twice as many pages to do so.” Sherry, supra note 15, at 183.
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One wonders whether that increased sense of autonomy has, at
times, lead the Court to believe its own affairs—that is, its own macrojudging—are beyond congressional purview. Consider, for example,
the Chief Justice’s recent (albeit somewhat veiled) suggestion that
Congress may lack the authority to require the Court to adopt ethics
rules.240 The Court’s current policy is wholly lacking,241 and its failure
to enact binding ethical rules on its own is deeply troubling. The Court
has seemingly bought into the idea that its work is just too important
to be hampered by silly things like ethics rules that might leave it short
a justice every now and then, thus forcing it to bypass a case the Court
wants to take or leaving it unable to reach a decision in another. The
Supreme Court, one might say, is the most exceptional of the
exceptional Article III courts.
While the Court’s macro-judging no doubt has ensured the
independence of the Third Branch, it may also have given birth to a
culture of judicial celebrity that is itself corrosive. Suzanna Sherry
recently linked the Supreme Court’s central dysfunctions to the
Justices’ emerging “status as celebrities.”242 On both the right and the
left, in recent years, Justices have made tv appearances, written books,
been the subject of movies, made “stump speeches,” and drafted
“separate opinions aimed at [their] polarized fan bases.”243
What Sherry identifies—the judicial cult of personality that has
developed around the Court—has been made possible, at least in part,
by macro-judging.244 With a reduced docket, and more and better
staff,245 the Justices have more time for pursuits that exalt themselves.
This “[u]nseemly celebrity-seeking by Supreme Court Justices,” Sherry
240 Hon. John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice of the United States, 2021 Year-End
Report
on
the
Federal
Judiciary,
at
5
(Dec.
31,
2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2021year-endreport.pdf
(identifying “need for the Judiciary to manage its internal affairs, both to promote
informed administration and to ensure independence of the Branch”). To be sure,
Congress may lack the authority to do so directly. See Louis J. Virelli III, The
(Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181. But see
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 656-61
(1987) (arguing Congress can regulate Supreme Court recusals).
241 See Virelli, supra note 240, at 1186-88 (explaining that “Supreme Court recusal
jurisprudence during the Court’s first century-and-a-half was entirely individual,
independent, and unreviewable” and observing even after Congress legislated to
included “justices” in the federal recusal statute, “the Justices have a far narrower
view of recusal” than appears in federal law).
242 See Sherry, supra note 15, at 182.
243 Id. at 185-87 (collecting examples).
244 Posner observed that one reasons Supreme Court justices have become more
engaged in “public intellectual activity”—including television appearances and media
engagement—was because “they ha[d] more time on their hands,” thanks to their
smaller merits docket. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court and Celebrity Culture, 88
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 299, 301 (2013).
245 See id. (“With larger and better staff and a lighter caseload the justices have
more time for travel, public intellectual activities, writing books, whatever it is they
like to do. The opportunity costs of being a public intellectual Supreme Court justice
thus have fallen.”).
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argues, “raises the suspicion that their actions are self-serving rather
than evidence of a commitment to impartial judging and the rule of
law.”246 It also creates additional incentives for “attention-seeking” that
may increase the polarization of the Court, as the Justices play to their
respective bases.247
One might imagine that Sherry would argue that the recent and
unprecedented leak of a draft decision overruling Roe v. Wade is all part
of the same248—and the leak very well may have been intended as
another play to the base. The cultural shift that Sherry traces—one
that, broadly speaking, puts the individual Justice above the
institution—is a cultural shift that makes a once unthinkable act (to say
nothing of a once-unthinkable opinion) almost expected. If Sherry’s
right, this won’t be the only such breach of the institution’s norms, and
perhaps it’s likely that the culture of Supreme Court exceptionalism—
a distinct and special form of Article III exceptionalism—has
something to do with it.
D.

The Article III Judiciary

Throughout the various crises chronicled in this Part, the Article
III bench collectively has objected—repeatedly and “vociferously”—
to the most obvious solution to many of these problems: doubling the
Article III bench to increase judicial capacity.249 To be sure, such an
investment would be expensive (in terms of both infrastructure and
salaries) and politically challenging. But one of the main objections to
judicial expansion has been, in the words of one former federal judge,
that doing so would “dilute prestige,” making it “harder to recruit firstrate lawyers” into federal judicial service.250 Another Article III judge
put it this way: “A federal judiciary of 3,000 to 4,000 . . . would also
include an unacceptable number of mediocre and even a few
unqualified people.”251 That might, he says, reduce the “quality of the
Sherry, supra note 15, at 188.
Id.
248 Josh Gerstein & Alexander Ward, Supreme Court Has Voted to Overturn Abortion
Rights,
Draft
Opinion
Shows,
POLITICO,
May
2,
2022,
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draftopinion-00029473.
249 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 167 (“The judicial
establishing has consistently acted and lobbied against the single most obvious
solution to the caseload glut—the creation of additional judgeships. Ironically, the
judiciary has opposed this solution vigorously.”). I should note, of course, that not
all federal judges shared this opposition to substantial judicial expansion. See, e.g.,
Alvin B. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 448, 459 (1976) (“It is
time to face the real problem. If we are not to abandon the tradition of ‘one appeal
as of right,’ and if we are to make this a true appeal int the traditional sense—one to
be heard and decided by judges—we need both more judges and more circuits.”).
250 Robert Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 234.
251 Hon. Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary,
72 JUDICATURE 187, 188 (1993).
246
247
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federal judiciary,” rendering it “indistinguishable from the most
pedestrian of state judiciaries.”252
Think for a minute about what that view says about the role of
Article III courts—especially vis-à-vis their state-court counterparts.
Gone, I suppose, are the somewhat “cheerful” days when Justice Story
cheekily stated that “the judges of state courts are, and always will be,
of as much learning, integrity, and wisdom, as those of the courts of
the United States.253 The dim view of state courts is part-and-parcel of
the modern story of Article III exceptionalism. Indeed, those who
generally oppose substantial Article III expansion often advocate for
federal “jurisdictional contraction,” a process that, of course, would
send some of that low-value work (those “small” cases) to state courts
(or Article I tribunals).254 As William Richman and William Reynolds
have explained, this debate, too, is rife with elitism (to say nothing of
its ignorance of the existing burden on state courts): “The elitism of
the jurisdiction retrenchment argument also appears in the proposed
destination for these trivial cases—the state courts. The idea seems to
be that penny-ante federal cases, while unworthy of the federal courts,
are fine for the state courts.”255 The state courts and their pedestrian
judges, that is.
The fear is that if the federal bench grows too big, it will not be
sufficiently special, important, and prestigious to attract the kind of
legal minds thought worthy of big, important Article III cases. I don’t
mean to sound overly dismissive of the genuinely held belief of lots of
Article III judges that too many authorized judgeships might be a bad
thing. Judges on the federal courts who all know far more than I do
about what it’s like to be a judge on a federal court argue that growing
the federal bench will hurt it: it will diminish the quality of justice and
dilute the quality of its judges; it will make the courts less collegial; it
will make the law more unstable because too many different judges will
be writing opinions, and courts will grow too large to keep track of all
those decisions.256
Many of the long-standing objections to substantial judicial
expansion—especially those rooted in fears about diluting the prestige,
collegiality, and quality of the Article III bench—sound like Article III
judges are more worried about themselves than the experience of the
Id.
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 346 (1816).
254 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 207.
255 Id. at 214. This view of what’s the province of federal power, versus state
power, is resonant with how Jill Hasday describes the construction of the family law
“canon” against the oft-repeated (and quite inaccurate) mantra that the federal courts
have no jurisdiction over family law. See generally Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family
Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825 (2004).
256 See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 173-206 (collecting
various objections to significant Article III expansion at the federal appellate level);
see also McAlister, supra note 11, at 1198-1200 (discussing judicial opposition to adding
judges to the federal appellate bench).
252
253
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litigants before them or the quality of judicial process those litigants
receive. Richman and Reynolds have responded thoroughly to these
various objections in their thoughtful career capstone devoted to what
I’ve identified as macro-judging reforms at the federal appellate courts,
and I see little in their response with which to disagree.257 The problem
is, as they explain, that the Article III courts “exist for the good of the
nation, not the professional satisfaction of the judges.”258
What’s perhaps most troubling about the persistent judicial
opposition to Article III expansion is what it reveals about Article III
exceptionalism. Federal judges may not be drawn to the bench for
reasons of salary and security—given, especially, the likelihood that
they could earn more in the private sector or even in legal academia
(the latter of which would also provide a substantial measure of
workplace security and autonomy).259 Perhaps it’s the power and
prestige of the position that is its most enduring and important feature
as a recruitment and retention tool, and substantial judicial expansion
threatens each.
Adding more judges to any court will dilute the power and prestige
of current Article III judges. Although some judges have argued that
“[i]f the work is rewarding and important, there will be more than
sufficient prestige” in the appointment,260 others have acknowledged
that the “attraction of exclusivity is only human.”261 And even if the
work is sufficiently rewarding in itself, that’s only true if Article III
judges are free to focus their attention on what they deem to be the
most important work, which is exactly what macro-judging across the
federal courts has permitted them to do. Exclusivity, autonomy,
prestige—none of these are values that necessarily serve the public
good, but they do serve the interest of the Article III judiciary.
To the extent a culture of Article III exceptionalism, and the elitism
that accompanies it, is necessary to cultivate and maintain a top-flight
Article III judiciary, then it’s time to consider the long-term costs of
cultivating Article III exceptionalism. The next Part begins to consider
those harms, as well as how Congress might engage more in areas
where Article III exceptionalism has free rein.

257 RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, INJUSTICE, supra note 11, at 173-06 (describing and
refuting nearly every aspect of the various judicial objections to substantial growth
of the Article III intermediate federal appellate courts).
258 Id. at 206.
259 Indeed, Richard Posner once argued that the only way to maintain highquality judicial candidates while substantially increasing the numbers of Article III
judges is to increase federal judicial salaries dramatically (thus, of course, making the
position more attractive). RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS &
REFORM 99 (1985).
260 Frank M. Coffin, Research for Efficiency and Quality: Review of Managing Appeals in
Federal Courts, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1857, 1867 (1990).
261 Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time as
the Greatest Innovator, 57 FORD. L. REV. 253, 261 (1988).
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III. CHECKING ARTICLE III EXCEPTIONALISM
This Part considers how Congress might address entrenched
Article III exceptionalism when exercising its constitutional authority
over macro-judging. It begins by considering some of the
consequences of entrenched Article III exceptionalism, before turning
to Congress’s role in regulating macro-judging. The risk, ultimately, is
that unchecked macro-judging tips the playing field in ways that render
micro-judging—or judicial decision-making in individual cases—
hazardous or subject to fewer (or no) guardrails.
My critique is that “judicial domination” in the design process not
only isolates designers from the system’s users,262 but it also risks
macro-judging based on judicial priorities that may not align with the
public interest. Where judges design their own institution, there is a
risk of the fox guarding the hen house. Scholars have expressed
concern before about judicial domination in the federal rule-making
process—which is macro-judging at its most formal—albeit largely for
different reasons.263 Whenever there is just one voice—and not, as
Resnik has advocated, a “cacophony”264—representing the various
constituencies within and without the Article III judiciary, there is a
risk of judicial aggrandizement in macro-judging.
These risks are greatest where the macro-judging process is both
highly informal and entirely contained within the judiciary itself. That’s
where macro-judging may advance judicial priorities over the public
good. Those risks are even greater where a single judge or small group
of judges has the power to act at the macro-level.265 But, by its nature,
262 Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
229, 231 (1998) (arguing that “judicial domination of rulemaking isolates procedural
designed, who today are mostly judges, from procedural consumers—lawyers and
litigants”).
263 See Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at 1030 (arguing that “Article III judiciary
should structure even its permissible collective action inclusively . . . to avoid judicial
domination of policy decision-making about issues affecting courts,” like the creation
of federal rules); Yeazell, supra note 262, at 231.
264 I agree with Resnik that encouraging a “cacophony” of voices within “the
federal judiciary” may be at least one solution to the problems discussed here. See
Resnik, Trial, supra note 4, at 1020-22.
265 These structures also raise other important concerns, too, including about
how the Chief Justice wields his appointment power in the context of formal macrojudging. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN M. FARHANG, RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT 244 (2017) (“Since the reconstitution of the Advisory Committee
in 1971, a series of Chief Justices, all of whom were appointed by Republican
presidents, have not only ensured that Article III judges dominated the committee.
They have ensured that a greatly disproportionate share of those appointments went
to judges who were themselves appointed by Republic presidents.”); James E.
Pfander, The Chief Justice, The Appointment of Inferior Officers, and the “Court of Law”
Requirement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1125 (2013). The lack of representation in macrojudging from those with diverse viewpoints, life experiences, and backgrounds is also
problematic. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, #SoWhiteMale: Federal Civil Rulemaking, 113
NW. U. L. REV. 407 (2018) (explaining that of the 136 individuals who have served
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little macro-judging is the product of a single judicial actor; even when
a small handful of judges may be responsible for generating a
recommendation or changing a court policy, many judges usually
perpetuate those systems.
Macro-judging may be most problematic when judges change
processes in ways that advantage more powerful constituencies to the
disadvantage of others who lack political voice. Where the burdens are
felt by the powerful, we might expect market forces to correct
imbalances or operate as informal “checks” on some forms of selfinterested macro-judging. That’s why, for example, the abuse of
bankruptcy court procedures by bankruptcy judges who “compete”266
for high-profile bankruptcy cases is not nearly as problematic as the
Supreme Court’s informal (and unreviewable) decision to reduce its
merits docket. Large bankruptcy proceedings involve sophisticated
players with political capital to get congressional attention to redress
that problem (were those players convinced that the competition was
deleterious, of course). Those who lose out on Supreme Court review,
on the other hand, are litigants who can’t afford to attract the attention
of the high-powered (and elite) Supreme Court bar that increasingly
drives the Supreme Court’s docket.267
Where the constituencies on the losing end of macro-judging
reforms are vulnerable litigants, Congress should be especially sensitive
to how courts have consolidated their power and autonomy—
including by revisiting existing structures or instituting new reforms or
oversight. MDLs are a good example, as are the mixture of macrojudging decisions at the heart of the federal appellate courts’ unilateral
development of a triage system. Both involve formal and informal
macro-judging and risk harm to vulnerable litigants. Take, for example,
the federal appellate system’s unilateral triage reforms. The
constituents on the losing end of those reforms were mostly pro se
litigants, prisoners, criminal defendants, asylum seekers, and Social
Security disability claimants—all of whom lack political power.
Imagine a world where instead of privileging the elite handful of
sophisticated disputes, federal appellate judges decided to privilege
only federal question cases involving issues of purported government
over-reach. It’s easy to see how sophisticated litigants—the businesses
often on the other side of the “v.” in complex civil litigation—might
on the Civil Rules Advisory Committee since its inception, 116 are white men and
exploring why that lack of diversity matters).
266 See supra note 192 discussing this phenomenon.
267 See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L.
REV. 1901, 1903–04 (2016) (“[T]he real story in the growth and especially the
influence of amicus filings is the dramatic spike in activity by the so-called Supreme
Court Bar. Today, elite, top-notch lawyers help shape the Court's docket by asking
other elite lawyers to file amicus briefs requesting that the Court hear their case.
When the Court grants certiorari (or “cert”), these very lawyers strategize about
which voices the Court should hear and they pair these groups with other Supreme
Court specialists to improve their chances with the Court.”).
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use their influence to change even the most informal of court
procedures through congressional action, were the federal appellate
system to turn upside-down and inside-out. The most important and
enduring macro-judging acts discussed above—the rise of MDLs,
reliance on Article I judges, and the creation of an appellate triage
system—all impose uneven burdens on vulnerable litigants to the
benefit of Article III judges (and more sophisticated court players).
That’s reason enough for more aggressive congressional oversight and
lawmaking in these areas.
What that oversight looks like may depend on the nature of macrojudging. Where it is at its most formal, Congress is already involved in
those efforts, but it must act with greater sensitivity to the possibility
of judicial aggrandizement—including, especially, by inviting
dissenting voices and different constituencies into what formal
processes exist. In theory, the more formal the process, the more
structural precautions against judicial power grabs in macro-judging
exist, if only because another actor—Congress, in particular—is
involved in that process. But these processes are far from perfect—
and risk something like judicial capture when Congress defers to
judicial priorities.
At bottom, Congress should be establishing macro-judging
priorities through the democratic process—and not the other way
around (where the courts create macro-judging priorities). Moreover,
congressional oversight should be more robust where reforms may
impose greater burdens on vulnerable litigants, like unrepresented
litigants. Whenever Congress legislates in and around areas of macrojudging, it should inquire of the courts how judicial recommendations
have been developed, whether and to what extent dissenting voices
and other constituencies have been involved in that process, and, in
the end, it should invite those other voices into the process. Where the
Judicial Conference process may be particularly vulnerable to judicial
domination—that is, where the process has been dominated by judicial
actors, as will usually be the case—Congress should take its
recommendations with at least a large grain of salt (and resist efforts
to defer to judicial recommendations based on nothing more than
deference to a co-equal branch of government).
To make these recommendations more concrete, consider judicial
opposition to Article III expansion—a process that runs through the
Judicial Conference. Congress should not defer to persistent judicial
objections to expand the federal courts because those objections are
shaped, in no small part, by entrenched (and rampant) elitism in the
federal courts.268 The process for generating a Judicial Conference
recommendation to Congress for more judges for a particular court

See McAlister, supra note 11, at 1198-1200 (discussing historical objections to
adding judges to the courts of appeals).
268
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relies entirely on a majority vote of judges from a circuit or district.269
Because there’s no public record memorializing that court’s
consideration and no opportunity to raise an objection to the
majority’s view, judicial recommendations on this front will almost
always be tainted by self-interested judicial priorities. At a minimum,
Congress should require courts considering the possibility of
expansion to memorialize dissenting views on those courts and engage
with litigants (represented and not) on these questions (including the
quality of existing judicial process and judicial opinions and their
timeliness).270
Given that I am both inviting and relying on Congress to exercise
active oversight of the judicial institution, as an institution, it is
appropriate to address, at least briefly, possible concerns about
separation of powers and an independent judiciary. Ultimately, “microjudging” and “macro-judging” map onto some of the limits of
legislative interference with constitutional judicial power. “Macrojudging” is within the purview congressional review; “micro-judging,”
that is, how to decide a case, is not.271 Congress certainly has the
power—both with respect to lower courts, over which it enjoys
plenary control272 but also as to the Supreme Court273—to adopt laws
related to “the operations of the judicial department.”274 The question,
then, is whether separation-of-powers principles set some outer limit
on the extent to which Congress can interfere with internal court
operations—ranging from recusal rules for Supreme Court justices,275
for example, to the decisional practices of the lower federal courts (e.g.,
setting limits on how many unpublished decisions may be issued). To
269 The Judicial Conference’s Recommendation for More Judgeships: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 3 (2020) (statement of Hon.
Miller, J., U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Chair, Judicial
Resources Committee, Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics).
270 See McAlister, supra note 11, at 1214-15 (discussing ways to increase
transparency and diversify voices in the process for making Judicial Conference
recommendations for adding authorized judgeships).
271 Suzanna Sherry reaches a similar conclusion as she surveys literature
analyzing congressional limits on interference with judicial decisionmaking: “the
process of effectual decisionmaking must be protected from congressional
interference.” Sherry, supra note 15, at 212. Congress, therefore, “cannot tell the
courts how to decide cases, nor can it deprive them of the power to make final
judgments.” Id.
272 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1; Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
273 See U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 2 (“exceptions” clause).
274 See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial DecisionMaking, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 198 (2001) (observing that it is “beyond cavil”
that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress authority “for congressional
legislation with respect to the operations of the judicial department”); see also John
Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 532-35
(2000); Willian Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of “The Sweeping
Clause,” 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 788, 807 (1975).
275 This is a “narrow” issue subject to its own academic debate. See Sherry, supra
note 15, at 210 & n.146 (collecting sources).

46

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4211636

the extent macro-judging decisions involve expenditures, Congress
undoubtedly can control those choices indirectly with the power of the
purse; it can reduce the number of magistrates or reduce the number
of appellate staff attorneys, as it sees fit. No doubt, Congress can
likewise require the federal appellate courts to create magistrates and
abandon their staff attorney project altogether; or it can afford
presidential appointment, life tenure, and salary protections to lesser
Article I judges (thus transforming them into Article III appointees).
Congress could also require the Supreme Court to take more, and more
uninteresting, cases, should it so choose, without running afoul of any
separation-of-powers concerns.276 Congress has substantial leeway to
exercise control over macro-judging without running afoul of the
separation-of-powers concerns that limit its reach into micro-judging.
But there is a deeper problem—one congressional engagement
may not be able to solve directly. The greatest harm of Article III
exceptionalism, in my view, is how it endangers judicial humility,277 or,
to put it differently, how it engenders judicial maximalism.278 Taken to
its most extreme, Article III judges convinced of their own specialness
may act recklessly and dangerously; they may jeopardize their own
legitimacy by acting immodestly—that is, by deciding more than is
needed.279 The only real constraint on judicial power in the
constitutional sphere is self-restraint; it is the decision of one judge to
act or not to act on the power he or she has—that is, to decide more
than what is needed or only what is needed.280 The most urgent
problem, then, is one of attitude or orientation—and that’s one that
276 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (exceptions clause); see also Ortman & Epps, supra
note 24, at 707 (proposing that the Supreme Court “or Congress by statute” institute
a “lottery docket,” whereby the Court “supplement[s] the traditional certiorari docket
with a small number of cases randomly selected from final judgments of the civil
courts”).
277 Judicial humility or judicial modesty is the subject of its own robust scholarly
treatment, which is beyond my scope here. For a somewhat recent overview of the
different treatments of the topic (especially among jurists), see Michael J. Gerhardt,
Constitutional Humility, 76 U. CINN. L. REV. 23 (2007) (Robert S. Marx Lecture).
278 See generally Schmidt, supra note 20 (identifying a more maximalist turn among
lower federal courts and advocating for structural reforms to enculturate a “mood”
of judicial minimalism).
279 This argument echoes the call for “minimalist” judicial rulings to preserve
Supreme Court legitimacy. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 69-72, 132,
250-56 (2d ed. 1986); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3-23, 39-41 (1999). Tara Leigh Grove has
argued recently, however, that where concerns about sociological legitimacy cause
the Supreme Court to issue “narrow decisions” or “deny certiorari in high-profile
cases,” it puts significant pressure on the lower federal courts in ways that jeopardize,
in turn, their legitimacy. See Tara Leigh Grove, Sacrificing Legitimacy in a Hierarchical
Judiciary, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (2021).
280 See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2311 (2022)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“If it is not necessary to decide more to
dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more.”).
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may be particularly difficult to address through legislative reforms. But
it may not be impossible.
Sherry’s solution, for example, offers one possibility. She suggests
that Congress address the Supreme Court’s attitude problem, if you
will, by, in effect, re-invigorating judicial modesty through legislative
fiat. If we have a Kardashian Court today, as Sherry evocatively calls
it, we might be better off with something of a Public-Service Court
tomorrow—one that exalts the ordinary over the extraordinary. Sherry
would require the court to “issue one, and only one, per curiam
opinion” to resolve every case; where five justices cannot agree, the
Court would have to state the outcome and that the justices cannot
agree on the reasoning; hers is a world without dissents and
concurrences; there are no plays to the base, no grandstanding, and no
separate writing to invite certain causes or issues to reach the Court.281
Sherry argues that her proposal would avoid the dangers of
minimalism by encouraging the justices to reach consensus on
decisions that are “maximalist enough to provide guidance.”282 Over
time, she envisions these restrictions as encouraging something of a
culture shift. The Justices might begin to view themselves less as
individual actors and more as part of an institution.283 What Sherry
wants, ultimately, is to make the Supreme Court a bit less exceptional
and the Justices themselves a bit less special.
Thomas Schmidt’s recent work on judicial minimalism in the lower
federal courts offers another note of optimism. He advocates, among
other things, for structural reforms that would de-emphasize the
power of individual judges (to issue nationwide judges, to receive
plumb litigation through related case rules and divisions assignments)
and increase the size of the federal bench.284 The latter—growing the
size of the federal bench—would reduce the urge toward judicial
maximalism in the handful of cases that, in particular, the federal
appellate courts devote their time and attention (those that the select
as sufficiently important).285 Increasing judicial capacity permits the
federal courts to distribute resources in a more egalitarian manner—a
move that undermines the present temptations of exceptionalism and
maximalism.
There’s every reason to think reforms that disturb the
exceptionalism narrative of Article III might return the courts to a
Sherry, supra, note 15, at 197 (discussing solutions).
Id. at 203.
283 Id. (“And if the proposal works as expected, the Justices should eventually
view themselves as intended—more as part of an institution and less as individual
actors.”).
284 See Schmidt, supra note 20, at 906-911 (discussing structural reforms to
increase opportunities for judicial decisional minimalism in the lower federal courts).
285 Id. at 911-12 (observing that “bifurcation” of work at the federal appellate
courts, where judges focus on the select few, published decisions “undermines
judicial minimalism by inducing judges to widen and deepen the few opinions that
are published”).
281
282
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more passive, minimalist, or public-service orientation. Macro-judging
may afford a judge more (or less) discretion; it may create more (or
less) autonomy; it may even instill more (or less) humility in the Article
III judge. Design features can encourage or discourage boldness and
aggrandizement; they can elevate or diminish the public-service
orientation of the federal courts; they, ultimately, have the power to
define what is important to our judicial institutions. My point is this:
it’s time for the people—acting through our elected representatives—
to set our own judicial priorities for the Article III courts. Greater
regulation of macro-judging may be one way to re-align those priorities
to privilege the public-service mission of the judiciary—that is, a
mission that heeds the priorities set by a democratic process—over the
aggrandizement of Article III.
CONCLUSION
We may be at an inflection point. Every generation surely lobs
cheers or boos at one or more of the Article III courts. Some see
today’s Article III courts as the culmination of a dream; others feel
they have awakened from a nightmare. Perhaps it’s not that extreme;
perhaps it is. Time will tell. In the meantime, though, we should take a
hard look at how we—all of us, but especially us academics—have
constructed the Article III courts as marble palaces reserved for only
the most important matters. It may be too extreme to say that all that
power has gone to Article III’s head. But it may not be.
Those who question judicial supremacy should take heed of how
we have exalted the judicial institution through procedural innovations.
Those innovations have given judges more power and autonomy; they
have insulated more decisions from appellate review; they have given
courts more discretion to set their own agendas and priorities. They
have all conveyed and confirmed Article III’s overriding feature: its
specialness. Perhaps reorienting the Article III courts to elevate the
ordinary over the extraordinary may enculturate a different attitude
than the one that now predominates in Article III courts. Just as
procedural reforms can entrench Article III exceptionalism, they can
also invigorate something new: Article III ordinariness, perhaps.

49

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4211636

